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INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause is cost blind; the Supreme Court is not. In 2004, in
Crawford v. Washington,1 the Supreme Court trumpeted its commitment to a procedural Confrontation Clause that required the prosecution to produce its witnesses
in court, regardless of the cost or inconvenience.2 In 2009, in Melendez-Diaz v.
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. The author acknowledges,
with gratitude, the enormous debt she owes to Professors Janet C. Hoeffel, Joseph A. Thorp,
and Keith Werhan; the excellent research assistance of Alexandra Brandes, Johannah Cousins,
Manpreet Kaur, and Jeffery R. McLaren; the workshop input of the Tulane Criminal Law
Scholarship Group; and the contributions of participants in the 2015 Vanderbilt Criminal
Law Roundtable: Professors Shima Baradaran, Jane Bambauer, Jeffrey Bellin, Russell Covey,
Andrew Ferguson, Richard Frase, Elizabeth Joh, David Harris, Terry Maroney, Robert
Mosteller, Song Richardson, and Christopher Slobogin.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Id. at 61–69.
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Massachusetts,3 the Court retreated, offering courts, legislatures, and prosecutors an
easy way to avoid confrontation-laden trials. On the one hand, the Court warned that
legislatures and courts could not “suspend the Confrontation Clause,” even if there
were “other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or verify” the
prosecution’s evidence.4 On the other hand, the Court declared that states were “free
to adopt procedural rules” that require a defendant to demand, or forfeit by inaction,
the protections of the Confrontation Clause.5 As a result, despite Crawford’s promise,
legislatures continue to minimize, or eliminate, the prosecution’s burden of producing
its testimonial witnesses.
This Article explores and critiques the Supreme Court’s puzzling productionminimizing approach to the Confrontation Clause. It does so, in part, by analyzing
the Court’s ambivalence about the value of production as an ongoing battle over constitutional costs. This battle pits the enforcement of constitutional structure against
the management of criminal justice costs. Of course, positing a conflict between
constitutional structure and constitutional cost is itself a false dichotomy, one that
fundamentally misunderstands the architecture of adversarial criminal procedure.
Nevertheless, between 1965 and 2004, the Supreme Court embraced that dichotomy
and a resultant jurisprudence of costs drove the Court’s confrontation jurisprudence.
Under this pre-Crawford jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of an out-of-court statement if it fell within a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.6
Since 2004, the Court claims to have rejected a cost-centric jurisprudence.
Crawford held that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [can be]
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”7 Crawford claimed to have restored
confrontation as a rule of production: the Confrontation Clause “commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”8 Confrontation’s costs, however, still
preoccupy the Court; the Court simply sells that old, cost-conscious wine in new,
Crawford-approved bottles. The result has been a withered confrontation jurisprudence that undermines the Confrontation Clause and the core structural premises of
constitutional criminal procedure.
Because the Confrontation Clause’s production mandate has been all but forgotten by the Court and most scholars, Part I describes the Confrontation Clause’s
burden of production. Critically, before the Confrontation Clause bestows any rights
upon the accused, it burdens the prosecution by requiring it to produce its witnesses
3
4
5
6
7
8

557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Id. at 318.
Id. at 327.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
541 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 61.
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at trial.9 Witness production—not cross-examination—is the threshold procedural
demand of the Confrontation Clause.10 Confrontation’s burden of production regulates
the prosecution’s presentation of testimonial evidence at every criminal trial. In
contrast, the accused’s confrontation rights (face-to-face confrontation and crossexamination) are contingent; they depend for their existence upon the prosecution’s
presentation of its witnesses’ testimony.11
Part II chronicles the erosion of a pre-incorporation, production-centric confrontation jurisprudence and the development of a production-minimizing confrontation
jurisprudence. In its earliest Confrontation Clause opinions, the Court acknowledged
confrontation’s primary goal of regulating the prosecution’s presentation of evidence.12
However, following the Court’s incorporation of the Confrontation Clause, the Court
developed a reliability-focused Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.13 The Court began
to balance confrontation’s alleged production costs against confrontation’s unequivocal
production mandate. The Court justified this extra-constitutional balancing test by
disparaging or dismissing the importance of confrontation’s production imperative.14
The Court further rationalized its restrictive Confrontation Clause with a myopic
focus on cross-examination and a corresponding deprecation of face-to-face confrontation.15 By elevating cross-examination over production, the Court justified the
admission of “reliable” out-of-court declarations in lieu of prosecutorial production
of testifying witnesses.16 The Supreme Court eviscerated confrontation’s production
imperative in order to reduce confrontation’s impact on case outcomes, conserve
scarce prosecutorial resources, and advance a wide range of public policy goals.
As Part III explains, since its Crawford decision in 2004, the Court has rhetorically
embraced confrontation’s procedural mandate of witness production. Yet, the Court
has refused to fully enforce confrontation’s rigorous demands. The Court remains
deeply ambivalent about the costs of witness production and about the consequences
9

Pursuant to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause only regulates the production of testimonial witnesses. Id. at 68.
10
As I discuss in Part IV infra, confrontation’s production mandate requires more than the
witness’s availability. “Because a defendant has the right to be confronted with his accusers,
the prosecution consequently has the burden to confront the defendant. This requires that the
prosecution subpoena the witness, that the prosecution put that accusing witness on the stand,
and that the witness actually testify.” Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay,
J., dissenting).
11
Thus, confrontation’s rights are contingent. See infra notes 22–39 and accompanying text.
12
See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (“The substance of the
constitutional protection is preserved [by] . . . seeing the witness face to face, and . . . subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.”).
13
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980) (holding that evidence from an
unavailable witness may be admitted if it shows adequate “indicia of reliability” (quoting
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972))).
14
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354–57 (1992).
15
Id. at 356–57.
16
Id.
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of demanding it. In a trio of post-Crawford cases, the Court has suggested that the
Constitution permits “notice-and-demand” statutes that require a defendant to make
a pretrial motion to confront a state’s witness or waive, by inaction, his right to
confrontation.17 Part III explains this notice-and-demand phenomenon as a product of
a jurisprudential battle that pits the enforcement of criminal procedure mandates against
the management of criminal procedure costs. By trivializing the constitutional significance of prosecutorial witness production, the Court has rationalized a continued
noncompliance with the prosecutorial obligation to produce testimonial witnesses.
Part IV offers an in-depth critique of the Court’s claim that the Constitution
permits a demand-waiver theory of confrontation. Neither precedent nor logic support
an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in which a defendant must demand, or
forfeit by silence, the enforcement of confrontation’s production imperative. When the
Court balances confrontation’s costs against the Constitution’s unequivocal production mandate, it undermines the integrity of the adversary system of justice. Legislatures, police, and prosecutors can consider confrontation’s costs in deciding whether
and how to prosecute crime; the Supreme Court cannot and should not. Confrontation’s production imperative is non-negotiable.
I. A CRISIS FOR CONFRONTATION’S RULE OF PRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause is composed of two parts: a prosecutorial burden and
a defense right. The prosecutorial burden is a rule of witness production: the prosecution must produce its witnesses and elicit their testimony at trial in the presence
of the defendant and the jury.18 The defense right is an entitlement to confrontation
and examination of testifying witnesses.19 Confrontation’s rule of production regulates the prosecution’s presentation of testimonial evidence.20 Confrontation’s right
to confrontation and examination guarantees the defendant’s right to face his accuser
before the jury, to hear the allegations against him, and to challenge those allegations
through cross-examination.21 The rule of production is the Confrontation Clause’s
mandate; the right to confrontation and examination is its privilege.
17

See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.
Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
18
Pursuant to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause only regulates the production of
testimonial witnesses. The statements of an absent testimonial witness are inadmissible
unless that witness is “unavailable” and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine that witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Between 2004 and
2014, the Supreme Court devoted considerable ink to explaining the criteria that distinguish
testimonial statements from non-testimonial statements. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131
S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). For purposes of this Article, the
term “witness” or “witnesses” refers to testimonial witness(es) whose accusations are subject
to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
19
See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
20
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69.
21
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–44.
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This Part discusses confrontation’s underexamined and undervalued production
mandate. It explains the structural necessity and due process implications of that
mandate. It also introduces the crux of the current Confrontation Clause crisis: the
burgeoning notice-and-demand phenomenon that undermines confrontation’s production mandate.
A. Confrontation’s Production Mandate
Confrontation’s rule of production guarantees a defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”22 The Framers wrote the Confrontation
Clause in the passive voice; thus, it operates as a rule that requires the prosecution
to produce its witnesses. A defendant has the constitutional right to be a passive
observer of the accusations against him23: “It is, after all, the prosecution’s burden
to call the witnesses who will prove its case.”24
Confrontation is thus a procedural rule that regulates the prosecution’s presentation of evidence by requiring it to place its witnesses before a defendant and his jury.
In turn, this mandate of production reinforces two important due process concepts: first,
at a criminal trial, the prosecution bears the burdens of production and persuasion;
second, a criminal defendant has the right to rely on the prosecution’s failure of
proof.25 Confrontation’s production imperative is the threshold procedural demand of
the Confrontation Clause.26
Confrontation’s mandate incorporates several underlying rules of production: the
prosecution must produce its witnesses at a public trial and elicit their accusations
under oath and in the presence of the defendant and the jury.27 Each aspect of this
production imperative both advances the due process command that the prosecution
bear the burden of production and persuasion and restrains the government from
abuses of power and process.
22

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
As Justice Scalia put it, the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him”
would be a “strange way to express a guarantee of nothing more than cross-examination.”
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018–19 n.2 (1988) (disputing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395, p.
154 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)); see also Sherman J. Clark, Essay, An Accuser-Obligation
Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1261 (2003) (“From the defendant’s perspective, [the Confrontation Clause] is not so much a right to confront witnesses,
as a right to require witnesses to confront you.”).
24
John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination,
and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 227 (1999).
25
Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 521–22 (2006).
26
Confrontation’s production mandate requires more than the witness’s availability:
“[T]he prosecution [must] subpoena the witness, . . . put that accusing witness on the stand,
and [have] the witness actually testify.” Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 479 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Clay, J., dissenting).
27
See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
23
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First, confrontation’s rule of production prevents the prosecution from bluffing
its way to victory.28 The prosecution cannot convict a defendant by promising that
it could prove the defendant’s guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, confrontation demands a due process showdown: the prosecution must meet its burden
of production and persuasion at trial, with live witnesses who confront the defendant
and undergo examination before the jury.29
Second, confrontation’s rule of production promotes integrity in the investigation
and prosecution of criminal cases. The Framers recognized the “unique potential for
prosecutorial abuse” when “government officers [are involved] in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial.”30 They responded with a production imperative that
discourages corrupt officials from manufacturing statements by non-existent witnesses,
or “conveniently ‘los[ing] track’” of problematic witnesses.31 Confrontation’s rule
28

See, e.g., Jeff Palmer, Note, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song
and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 524 & n.108 (1999) (when the prosecution “need not
present any evidence or witnesses in court, a bluff may result in a conviction” (quoting ROBERT
A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 178 (3d ed. 1996))).
29
Id. at 524 n.108.
30
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004); see also Gordon Van Kessell,
Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 477, 509 (1998) (arguing that skepticism about the good faith of government
actors was “an important factor leading to the increased importance of cross-examination and
the ascendancy of the adversary system”).
31
Van Kessell, supra note 30, at 514.
Except in limited contexts such as police-conducted, post-accusation
eye-witness identifications and in-custody interrogations of subjects, the
Supreme Court has not imposed even minimal constitutional protections
governing the creation of witness statements, whether by the prosecution
or the defense.
...
[Without a production mandate, an official] who desires to fabricate a
hearsay statement [is] free to choose [a] place and time when no one
[is] present but the witness and supposed declarant, such that it would
be difficult to show the statement was never made, especially if the
declarant [is] no longer available [or never existed at all].
Id. at 503–04; see also Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 586–87 (1992)
(“[A]cknowledg[ing] the dangerous ability of the government to shape evidence through inquisition” and that investigative conduct might “prevent the accused’s fate from being determined
by the police’s out-of-court activities rather than by the jury” (citing United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964))); Roger C. Park, Purpose
as a Guide to the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 297, 298
n.5 (2005) (arguing that “abuse of state power” is the “core concern” of the Confrontation
Clause and the justification for “a confrontation procedure not constitutionally required in
other types of legal proceedings”); Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay
Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623 (1992);
Daniel Shaviro, The Supreme Court’s Bifurcated Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,
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of production also discourages law enforcement from exerting improper or undue
influence on a witness’s out-of-court statements.32 The production mandate ensures
that the prosecution’s witnesses appear at trial “to correct and explain” any prior
statements attributed to them by law enforcement.33 This is a powerful incentive for
investigative integrity in the collection of witness statements.34 Confrontation’s rule
of production is thus a critical safeguard against the investigatory excesses and
abuses inherent in an adversary system.35
Third, confrontation’s rule of production requires that the prosecution’s witnesses
confront the defendant at trial with substantive allegations against him. These allegations
must be made under oath or affirmation and under penalty of perjury.36 Conventional
wisdom holds that these safeguards increase the reliability of witness testimony by
“impressing [the] duty [to testify truthfully] on the witness’s conscience.”37 When prosecution witnesses make sworn, face-to-face statements in the jury’s presence, they
provide the defendant with clear notice of the precise testimony the jury will consider.38
17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383 (1990) (urging a “functionalist” view of the Confrontation
Clause as a restraint upon prosecutorial misconduct).
32
Berger, supra note 31, at 586 (requiring the prosecution to call its declarant to the stand
limits the prosecution’s power to “orchestrate [pretrial] proceedings to shape the evidence”);
see Park, supra note 31, at 298 (defining undue influence as “[p]ressuring the declarant with
torture, abuse or intimidation, or taking advantage of vulnerabilities of the declarant”); Van
Kessell, supra note 30, at 503 (arguing that factual assertions by unproduced prosecution
witnesses are “particularly susceptible to creation and manipulation in the context of partycontrolled” litigation). Moreover, as Blackstone explains, even without malicious intent, “an
artful or careless scribe may make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing up his
depositions in his own forms and language.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373.
33
BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *373.
34
See John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1797 (2001) (arguing that production of accomplices would encourage witness confrontation
and change a prosecutor’s pretrial decisions).
35
Van Kessell, supra note 30, at 505. “Partisan evidence gathering and presentation
aggravates” the risks associated with admitting out-of-court statements of unproduced witnesses. Id. The general risk that adversaries will manipulate evidence for presentation at trial
increases in criminal cases. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7.
36
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158–59 (1970); see also Richard D. Friedman &
Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2002) (“[T]estimony
must be given under prescribed conditions, among which are that it must be under oath . . . .”).
37
FED. R. EVID. 603; see also Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (stating that the oath helps “guard[]
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury”); Fredric I. Lederer, Technology
Comes to the Courtroom, and . . . , 43 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1119–21 (1994).
38
Clark, supra note 23, at 1261. Professor Clark notes that, like the Confrontation Clause,
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is also phrased in the
passive voice: “Perhaps the Information Clause . . . reinforces the meaning of that stretch of
Sixth Amendment landscape. The state must inform and the witness must confront.” Id. at
1266; see also Park, supra note 31, at 298 (noting that, if a witness does not make her
accusation on the witness stand, she “prevent[s] the defendant from learning facts about the
declarant, hearing the declarant’s whole story, or learning about the circumstances under
which the story was given”).
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This sworn in-court testimony also enables the defendant to meaningfully exercise
the right to cross-examination.39
In sum, confrontation’s mandate of production does not depend upon the effectiveness of cross-examination or, indeed, upon whether the defendant conducts crossexamination. Confrontation’s rule of production is a deliberate structuring of the
adversary process that burdens the prosecution with the affirmative obligation of
producing its witnesses at a place and time determined by the court. In some cases,
confrontation’s production mandate will require the acquittal of a factually guilty
defendant because of the prosecution’s failure to produce a witness or the trial
court’s exclusion of testimonial hearsay. In other cases, confrontation’s mandate will
require police and prosecutors to spend countless hours and thousands of dollars
locating and securing their testimonial witnesses. These are the intended consequences of confrontation’s rule of production. Yet, as will be discussed, for the past
fifty years, the Supreme Court has steadily undervalued confrontation’s rule of production and overvalued confrontation’s right to cross-examination.
B. A Preview of the Notice-and-Demand Threat to Production
The burgeoning crisis undermining confrontation’s burden of production lies in
so-called “notice-and-demand” statutes. In dicta in the 2009 case of Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court asserted that notice-and-demand statutes were
constitutionally valid rules.40 Specifically, the Court stated that the Constitution
permits a state to “requir[e] the defendant to give early notice of his intent to confront” a prosecution witness or waive by inaction his right to confrontation.41 These
notice-and-demand statutes require a defendant to make an explicit pretrial demand
for enforcement of the Confrontation Clause at trial. A defendant’s failure to timely
make the demand relieves the prosecution of its burden of production, constitutes
consent to the admission of a witness’s out-of-court statements, and waives the
defendant’s right to cross-examination.42
As discussed later in this Article, notice-and-demand rules relieve the prosecution of its burden of production by requiring a defendant to affirmatively invoke the
39

As will be discussed herein, notably, the prosecutorial burden of witness production
is what distinguishes the Confrontation Clause from the Compulsory Process Clause. Absent
the requirement for prosecutorial production, the Confrontation Clause promises a defendant
nothing more than the right to compel the testimony of hostile witnesses. Equating availability with production would ignore the fundamental adversary structures established by the
Constitution. The defendant has the right to confrontation of prosecution witnesses and to
the compulsory process of defense witnesses.
40
557 U.S. 305, 326–27 (2009).
41
Id. at 326.
42
See id. at 355 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As I have noted elsewhere, those statutes evolved
in order to minimize or evade confrontation’s actual and perceived costs. See Metzger, supra
note 25.
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confrontation right.43 Melendez-Diaz thus encourages courts and legislatures to do
what the Constitution prohibits: conflate confrontation and compulsory process, and
shift the Confrontation Clause’s burden of production from the prosecution to the
defense.44 These notice-and-demand provisions mark a radical departure from the
Confrontation Clause’s rule of production. They present a dangerous threat to the
structural protection associated with the confrontation guarantee and with other Sixth
Amendment rights: namely, the criminal defendant’s right to “do nothing at all” and
rely on the government’s failure of proof.
What explains the Court’s retreat from a confrontation-rich system of criminal
justice? How can we understand the Court’s systematic devaluation of confrontation’s production imperative during the post-incorporation and post-Crawford eras?
The answers lie in the Court’s concerns about the costs of criminal procedure compliance, particularly in the post-incorporation era of exploding criminal justice dockets.
However, as set forth below, even Crawford did not return the Court toward a more
production-centric Confrontation Clause. The Court continues to grapple with the
costs of confrontation compliance.
II. CONFRONTATION AND PRODUCTION BEFORE CRAWFORD
In its nineteenth century confrontation cases, the Supreme Court embraced confrontation as a rule of production. However, after its 1965 incorporation of the clause,
the Court, along with commentators, increasingly characterized production as an incidental aspect of the Confrontation Clause.45 Confrontation’s production imperative
was recast as a costly and cumbersome procedural “means” to confrontation’s substantive “end” of a reliable trial verdict.46 That analysis overlooked the clause’s
procedural goal of prosecutorial production and emphasized, instead, its substantive
aim of reliability. This focus on cross-examination quickly turned into a myopic
commitment to admitting reliable evidence, regardless of whether it was presented
by live witnesses. By 2003, the Court had all but eviscerated confrontation’s rule of
production: if a trial court determined that a witness’s statements were reliable, the
prosecution had no obligation to produce that witness at trial; even cross-examination was unnecessary as it would not add to the accuracy of the verdict.47 This
43

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 355 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
These rules are not solely the creatures of legislatures or criminal rules committees. In
2014, the New Jersey Supreme Court sua sponte announced a notice-and-demand requirement
for defendants. State v. Williams, 95 A.3d 701, 709 (N.J. 2014) (allowing the “State [to]
notify the defendant of its intention to call an expert witness who did not conduct, supervise,
or participate in a scientific or other such test about which he or she will testify” and requiring the defense “to notify the State [if] it objects to the expected testimony of the expert
witness on Confrontation Clause grounds”).
45
See Richard D. Friedman, Essay, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86
GEO. L.J. 1011, 1014–22 (1998).
46
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).
47
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).
44
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utter disregard for confrontation’s rule of production was a dramatic shift from the
Court’s original understanding of the Confrontation Clause.
A. The Original Understanding of Production
The United States adopted the Confrontation Clause in 1791. Then, as now, the
clause promised that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”48 Over the next 174 years,
the Supreme Court issued only a handful of opinions on the Confrontation Clause and,
because the clause had yet to be incorporated, those cases all arose out of federal
criminal prosecutions.49 In those opinions, the Court demonstrated a firm commitment to confrontation’s demand for witness production.
Witness production was the central tenet of the Court’s pre-incorporation understanding of the Confrontation Clause. The requirement of live witnesses who provided
testimony at trial animated the Court’s enforcement of the Confrontation Clause.50
The Supreme Court expected that the prosecution’s evidence would come from
declarants’ sworn trial testimony, not from ex parte affidavits, depositions, or thirdparty hearsay.51 Facts “which [could] be primarily established only by witnesses”
could not “be proved . . . except by witnesses who confront [the accused] at the
trial.”52 The Court insisted that “testimony for the people in criminal cases [could]
only, as a general rule, be given by witnesses in court, at the trial.”53
The legal community similarly recognized that the Constitution’s requirement of
live witnesses affirmatively burdened the prosecution with the obligation of witness
production.54 The Confrontation Clause meant both that “proof by witnesses was an
indispensable condition to an adverse verdict,” and that the prosecution bore the
48

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Court issued its first substantive Confrontation Clause opinion in the 1878 case
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Between 1879 and 1965, when the Court incorporated the Confrontation Clause to the states, the Court relied upon the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to consider state defendants’ claims concerning the
prosecution’s non-production of witnesses or the undue restriction of the rights to face-toface confrontation and cross-examination.
50
See Berger, supra note 31, at 568–71, n.58 (citing 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 1, 875–76 (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C.
Hansard 1816)).
51
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
52
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
53
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472 (1900) (emphasis added).
54
State supreme courts adopted similar interpretations of their respective constitutional
provisions concerning confrontation. For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio characterized
Ohio’s confrontation provision as a “requirement that the accused shall be confronted, on his
trial, by the witnesses against him, [which] has sole reference to the personal presence of the
witnesses.” Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 325, 341 (1856).
49
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burden of producing that proof at trial.55 Unsurprisingly then, the Court’s early
confrontation cases assumed that the prosecution must produce its witnesses’ testimony at trial or forego admission of those witnesses’ statements.
In Mattox v. United States, one of its earliest Confrontation Clause opinions, the
Supreme Court explained that the only exceptions to confrontation’s production
mandate were those that would have been acknowledged under common law when
the Sixth Amendment was adopted.56 The Court adopted those exceptions with
considerable reluctance.57 Those exceptions were: the dying declarations rule,58 the
doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing,59 and a common law doctrine of witness incapacity. The witness incapacity rule admitted the statements of absent witnesses if the
prosecution proved that the witness was “dead, insane, [or] too ill ever to be expected
to attend the trial,” and the witness’s prior statements were taken under trial-like
conditions.60 Each of these three exceptions conditioned the admissibility of out-ofcourt declarations upon the impossibility of prosecutorial witness production.61
These very narrow exceptions did not change the Supreme Court or the lower
federal courts’ firm belief that the Confrontation Clause imposed a rule of production that the prosecution elicit its witnesses’ testimony at trial or forego reliance on
its absent witnesses’ out-of-court declarations. If the prosecution was unable to locate a witness62 or the witness’s location rendered him unsusceptible to legal service,63 federal trial judges refused to admit the witness’s out-of-court statements:
55

United States v. Bigelow, 14 D.C. (3 Mackey) 393, 398 (1884).
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; see also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)
(“The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly
known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government,
but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our
English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized
exceptions, arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the
fundamental law there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to
be recognized as if they had been formally expressed.”).
57
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. In dicta, the Mattox Court noted that dying declarations were
a common-law exception to the rule of production. Id. The Court made no effort to justify
them as compliant with the rule of production. See id. Rather, the Court criticized the admission of dying declarations as inconsistent with the principles of adversary litigation. Id.
58
Id.
59
See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904).
60
Id. (noting that, at common law, out-of-court depositions were inadmissible unless “the
defendant was present [for the deposition] and . . . the defendant’s counsel had had an
opportunity to cross-examine”).
61
Id. (noting that exceptions exist when “the witness was at the time of the trial dead, insane,
too ill ever to be expected to attend the trial, or kept away by the connivance of the defendant”).
62
United States v. Angell, 11 F. 34, 43 (C.C.D.N.H. 1881) (emphasizing that the court
could find no case admitting the prior criminal trial testimony of an “absent but living” witness “to be proved at a subsequent [criminal] trial”).
63
See West, 194 U.S. at 262 (noting that no clear authority permitted the prior sworn
56
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“his testimony cannot be received in criminal cases, even if he be beyond the jurisdiction
of the court or of all the United States.”64 The legal inquiry was not whether a trial without live witness testimony would produce an accurate verdict; rather, the inquiry was
whether the prosecution had met its burden of eliciting, at trial, testimonial evidence
from its witnesses. As one federal court explained, the accused has a constitutional right
“to be confronted with the [living] witnesses against him . . . [n]ot if they can be produced, nor if they be within the jurisdiction, but absolutely and on all occasions.”65
This production-centered understanding of confrontation emerges clearly in the
1899 case of Kirby v. United States.66 In the mid-1800s, Congress enacted legislation that facilitated prosecutions for the receipt of stolen government property by
reducing the government resources required for such prosecutions.67 By statute, the
conviction of a “principal felon” who had stolen U.S. government property was
admissible in the trial of the property’s alleged receiver as conclusive evidence that
the “property of the United States” has been “embezzled, stolen or purloined.”68
Instead of transporting the convicted “principal” felon to court, the prosecution
could simply introduce his judgment of conviction or the transcript of his guilty
plea.69 Thus, the statute reduced the costs of prosecutorial production by authorizing
an out-of-court declaration to substitute for live witness testimony.
In Kirby, the United States Supreme Court emphatically rejected this congressional scheme for evading the prosecution’s burden of production.70 The Kirby
prosecution had introduced the convictions of the principal felons who had been
convicted of stealing the goods in question.71 The trial court then instructed the jury
that the hearsay evidence of the convictions was conclusive evidence of the essential
element concerning property stolen from the United States.72 The Supreme Court
reversed Kirby’s conviction, holding that the admission of the out-of-court evidence
violated the Confrontation Clause.73 Kirby declared the Court’s willingness to accept
the outcome costs of a Constitutional mandate of production. Kirby’s factual guilt
or innocence was irrelevant; if the prosecution failed to honor the Confrontation
Clause’s procedural mandate, the Constitution demanded reversal.
testimony of prosecution witnesses whose “non-residence” or “permanent absence” from the
jurisdiction prevented the prosecution from producing the witnesses at trial).
64
Angell, 11 F. at 43 (emphasis added).
65
Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.D.
Ill. 1851) (No. 15,702) (stating it is “clear” that an absent witness’s pretrial testimony in a
criminal prosecution was inadmissible “for, first, the witness was living”).
66
174 U.S. 47 (1899).
67
See id. at 48.
68
Id. at 61.
69
Id. at 50–54.
70
Id. at 53–54.
71
Id. at 49–50.
72
Id. at 50.
73
Id. at 55.
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Considering a murder-conspiracy prosecution in Motes v. United States, the
Supreme Court similarly declined to modify confrontation’s rule of production.74 In
Motes, the prosecution failed to produce its testimonial witness, William Taylor.75
Instead, the prosecution offered into evidence a transcript of Taylor’s preliminary
examination. Although the transcript of the preliminary examination would be “quite
sufficient, if accepted by the jury as true, to establish [his] guilt,” the Court reversed
Motes’s conviction.76 The prosecution’s procedural failure to meet its burden of
witness production mooted any consideration of the reliability of the verdict. The Court
acknowledged that, without Taylor’s out-of-court accusations, the prosecution could
not establish an essential element of the offense.77 Still, the Confrontation Clause
required the prosecution to produce Taylor.78
The Motes opinion emphasized both the physical burden of witness production
and the constitutional allocation of that burden to the prosecution. The Court explained
that the only exceptions to the burden of production were those “recognized exceptions to the general rule prescribed in the Constitution,”79 where the witness was
“deceased, . . . insane, or sick and unable to testify,” or “summoned [by the prosecution] but . . . kept away by the opposite party.”80 The Motes prosecution faced none
of those incapacities. When the prosecution called Taylor to testify, he simply “did
not appear.”81 Thus the prosecution was unable to produce its witness and its inability “was manifestly due to the negligence of the officers of the Government.”82
Motes reaffirmed the primacy of the production mandate; the Confrontation
Clause affirmatively requires the prosecution to “summon” and produce its witnesses at trial.83 In coming decades, however, the Court’s dedication to this tenet
74

178 U.S. 458, 467 (1900).
Id. at 468.
76
Id. at 471.
77
Taylor’s testimony was necessary to establish the proof of a conspiracy to commit
murder. See id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 474.
80
Id. at 472 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS *318 (2d
ed. 1871)).
81
Id. at 471. Rather, the prosecution had “committed” its witness “to jail without bail,” and,
after Motes’s trial began, “the official agent of the United States in violation of law took [the
witness] from jail . . . and, strangely enough, placed him in charge . . . of another witness for
the Government with instructions to the latter to allow him to stay at a hotel at night with his
family.” Id.
82
Id. at 471, 474 (stating that the Constitution does not “permit the deposition or statement
of an absent witness (taken at an examining trial) to be read at the final trial when it does not
appear that the witness was absent by the suggestion, connivance or procurement of the accused, but does appear that his absence was due to the negligence of the prosecution”).
83
See id. at 474 (“We are unwilling to hold it to be consistent with the constitutional requirement that an accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him, to permit the
deposition or statement of an absent witness (taken at an examining trial) to be read at the
final trial . . . .”).
75
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would wane. The Court’s enforcement attention would shift from confrontation as
a procedural rule of production to confrontation as a substantive guarantor of reliability.
Simultaneously, the Court would develop a jurisprudence of costs, weighing the
price of production as a measure of the need to reduce confrontation’s burden.
B. Incorporation: Valuing Substantive Reliability over the Structural
Constitutional Mandate of Prosecutorial Witness Production
Before incorporation, the Court had seldom addressed the Confrontation Clause. Incorporation caused an exponential increase in the Supreme Court’s criminal docket, and
its Confrontation Clause docket was no exception.84 Incorporation of the Confrontation
Clause also coincided with an explosion in state criminal prosecutions and the rapid
emergence of formal evidence codes.85 The Court’s attention soon turned to the practicalities that confronted the states as they attempted to comply with confrontation’s
rule of production. The result was a steady and ruthless retreat from confrontation’s
production mandate and toward a cross-examination-centered Confrontation Clause.
Courts and commentators have thoroughly documented the twisted mental gymnastics by which the Court’s post-incorporation case law produced the toothless
confrontation doctrine that was eventually overruled by Crawford v. Washington.
What has been overlooked is the extent to which cost consciousness drove the preCrawford jurisprudence. Recognizing limited governmental resources, prosecutors,
police, judges, and politicians argued that confrontation’s costs precluded its enforcement.86 And the Court, in response, began to attend to the practical consequences of
the Confrontation Clause.87 Deference to the broad “war on crime” and concerns
about highly politicized issues such as a domestic violence and child sexual abuse came
to animate the Court’s confrontation jurisprudence.88 The Court openly attempted “to
balance the interests of the accused against the public’s ‘strong interest in effective law
enforcement.’”89 As the Court evidenced a willingness to consider these costs,
84

As Professor Graham aptly stated, “[W]hen the Court made the federal right of confrontation binding on the states . . . it loosed the demons of Hell.” Kenneth Graham,
Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 209, 210 (2005).
85
The Confrontation Clause was incorporated by the Supreme Court in 1966. Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Over thirty states enacted state rules of evidence between 1966 and
1984. Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals
of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 256 (1984). During that same time period, the “war
on drugs” caused an explosion in state and federal criminal prosecutions. Note, Winning the War
on Drugs: A “Second Chance” for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1485,
1487 (2000) (noting that the prison population increased tenfold between 1980 and 1993).
86
See infra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
87
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 341 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing “the costs today’s decision imposes on criminal trials”).
88
See infra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
89
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 557 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980)).
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prosecutors and their allies grew bolder, urging the Court to limit confrontation’s production mandate in order to facilitate faster, cheaper, and easier criminal convictions.90
Eventually, confrontation’s effects on case outcomes, prosecutorial resources, and
larger societal interests came to dominate the Court’s confrontation jurisprudence.
1. Incorporation: Production’s Last Gasp
The Court incorporated the Confrontation Clause in 1965 in Pointer v. Texas.91
After Pointer’s preliminary hearing, but before his trial, one of the prosecution’s key
witnesses moved from Texas to California.92 At trial, the prosecution offered, and
the trial court admitted, a transcript of the absent witness’s preliminary hearing, the
State’s only evidence of essential elements of the crime alleged against Pointer.93
Pointer, who had no attorney at the preliminary hearing, had been present for the
witness’s testimony, but had not asked any questions.94
The Pointer Court considered whether introduction of the preliminary hearing
transcript of a witness’s uncross-examined testimony violated Pointer’s rights under
the Confrontation Clause and held that the prosecution’s failure to produce the
witness violated the Confrontation Clause.95 In so doing, the Court emphasized both
the procedural and substantive aspects of the Confrontation Clause.96 It affirmed
confrontation’s right to cross-examination, noting that “a major reason underlying
the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with crime an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.”97 However, it also affirmed
the essential adversarial function of confrontation’s rule of production:
In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the “evidence developed”
against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public
courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s
right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.98
90

See infra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
92
Id. at 401.
93
Id. In oral argument, Justice White pressed the State’s counsel on this point, asking,
“[Y]ou don’t suggest that the State would have had a case without the testimony of the complaining witness, do you?” The State’s counsel reluctantly agreed. Oral Argument at 21:50,
Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (No. 577), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1964/577.
94
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401.
95
Id. at 400.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 406–07.
98
Id. at 405 (emphasis added) (quoting Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472–73 (1965)).
91
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To the Pointer Court, prosecutorial witness production was “as indispensable an
ingredient [of American criminal procedure] as the ‘right to be tried in a courtroom
presided over by a judge.’”99
In another incorporation-era case, Barber v. Page,100 the Court again held that the
prosecution’s failure to produce its witness for trial violated the Confrontation
Clause.101 In Barber, the prosecution had made “no effort to obtain the presence of
Woods” (its witness) to testify at trial.102 Barber’s counsel had not cross-examined
Woods at the preliminary hearing, and the prosecution argued that Woods “unavailable” to testify at trial because he was in prison “outside the jurisdiction.”103 Over
objections, the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce Woods’s preliminary
hearing testimony.104
The Supreme Court reversed Barber’s conviction because “the State made
absolutely no effort to obtain the presence of Woods at trial other than to ascertain
that he was in a federal prison outside Oklahoma.”105 The Court rejected any argument that “the mere absence of a witness from the jurisdiction [is] sufficient ground
for dispensing with confrontation.”106 Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause precluded
admission of the absent witness’s prior testimony.107
Significantly, the Barber Court insisted that it “would reach the same result on the
facts of this case had petitioner’s counsel actually cross-examined Woods at the preliminary hearing.”108 In other words, the Barber opinion turned on the prosecution’s
99

Id. at 410 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727
(1963)). Justice Harlan’s concurrence foreshadowed later developments in confrontation law
designed to focus on state rules. Specifically, Justice Harlan feared that incorporating the
Confrontation Clause might discourage “differences between the methods used to effectuate
legitimate federal and state concerns.” Id. at 408–09 (Harlan, J., concurring). Interference
with the development of evidentiary codes was a concern of the states in subsequent Confrontation Clause cases. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970) (No. 387), 1970 WL 116822, at *25; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (No. 387), 1970 WL 116825, at *3; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 8, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (No. 10), 1970 WL 136602.
100
390 U.S. 719 (1968).
101
Id. at 724–25.
102
Id. at 723.
103
Id. at 722.
104
Id. at 720.
105
Id. at 723.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 724–25.
108
Id. at 725 (emphasis added) (citing Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 459 (1900)).
The Barber Court also rejected the argument that the defendant’s failure to cross-examine
Woods at the preliminary hearing constituted a waiver of his right to be confronted by Woods
at trial: “To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver
of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition
of a waiver as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’”
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (citing Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966)).
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failure to honor the burden of production; that failure rendered irrelevant the reliability of the testimony admitted at trial.109 Nevertheless, as the next section demonstrates, the Court quickly began to retreat from its insistence that the prosecution
bear confrontation’s burden of production.
2. The Post-Incorporation Jurisprudence of Confrontation’s Costs
As incorporation exponentially increased the Court’s consideration of state court
production issues, arguments about “State’s rights”110 and the “costs” of production,
began to animate the Court’s Confrontation Clause cases. Prosecutors argued that
enforcing confrontation’s production mandate would reduce prosecutions, increase
“lenient” plea bargains, and complicate or prevent convictions.111 They also insisted
that enforcing confrontation’s production mandate would drain scarce prosecutorial,
law enforcement, and judicial resources.112 Finally, they insisted that enforcing
confrontation’s mandate would work a host of systemic harms by disrupting the
balance of power between the states and the federal government, stunting the growth
of evidentiary codes,113 increasing crime rates, and discouraging victims from
reporting those crimes.114
Federal and state prosecutors began to argue about the outcome and resource
costs associated with the enforcement of confrontation’s production mandate. They
insisted that witness production would be both costly and “extraordinarily disruptive
to the orderly disposition of criminal proceedings.”115 New York prosecutors
109

Ironically, Barber’s brief to the Supreme Court emphasized the right to cross-examination
over the prosecution’s burden of production and the right to face-to-face confrontation. Brief of
Petitioner, Barber, 390 U.S. 719 (No. 703), 1968 WL 129320, at *6–7 (citing 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE, EVIDENCE]).
110
For example, in the oral argument in the 1968 case of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970), the Georgia Attorney General raised systemic concerns about states’ rights. Oral
Argument at 14:36, Dutton, 400 U.S. 74 (No. 10), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger1
/oral_argument_audio/15565. Georgia complained that the Court’s demand of witness production was “in reality nothing less than a transfer from the legislatures and courts of the
States to the Federal judiciary” and that “[t]he disruptive effect of this sort of Federal ‘I am
King’ test upon the trial of criminal cases in State courts is not difficult to foresee.” Brief of
Attorney General of Georgia, Dutton, 400 U.S. 74 (No. 10), 1968 WL 129285, at *16.
111
See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
112
Id.
113
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, states were beginning to develop robust codes
of evidence, modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence, which actively sought to “eliminate
the necessity for production of declarants where production would be unduly inconvenient
and of small utility to a defendant.” Dutton, 400 U.S. at 96 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). Chief Justice Burger urged that the Court allow “the States to experiment and
innovate, especially in the area of criminal justice.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171
(1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
114
See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
115
Brief of Attorney General of Georgia, supra note 110, at *24.
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complained that, “if strictly and technically applied,” a mandate of witness production
would “hamper[ ] the States both in individual prosecutions, and in formulating procedural rules to cope with the changing times and conditions.”116 Law enforcement and
its advocates openly urged instead that doctrine of “prosecutorial necessity” should
govern confrontation’s production mandate (and thereby facilitate convictions).117
As will be further discussed, co-conspirator testimony was of particular concern
to prosecutors. Federal prosecutors insisted that conspiracy was both uniquely dangerous and uniquely difficult to prove.118 They urged the Court to endorse a co-conspirator exception to the Confrontation Clause, because “group action toward an
antisocial end is inherently more dangerous to society than individual movement
toward that same end.”119 The arguments were based on pure expediency: the
prosecution’s “legitimate need for declarations of co-conspirators in proving crimes
involving joint-ventures” made it “essential” that the Court create an exception that
would allow prosecutors to avoid calling co-conspirators to the witness stand.120
In addition, prosecutors and courts expressed a growing concern about the systemic effects of a vibrant enforcement of confrontation’s production mandate. Urging
restraint in the Court’s enforcement of confrontation’s production imperative, federal
prosecutors argued that “federal courts—already burdened by a heavy case load of
habeas corpus applications seeking to challenge state convictions—should not be
called upon to review the minutiae of State rules of evidence in collateral proceedings.”121 The United States Attorney’s Office cautioned that a procedural “morass
116

Brief of District Attorney of Monroe County, New York, as Amicus Curiae at 2, Mancusi
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (No. 71-237), 1971 WL 133553.
117
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Dutton, supra note 99, at 15–16.
118
Id. at 17. Because of the “testimonial witness” requirement, Crawford and its progeny
do not speak to the constitutionality of introducing co-conspirator statements.
119
Id. It would be nearly twenty years before the Court endorsed that position. State prosecutors urged similar arguments. They characterized the post-incorporation era as a “time[]
of mass disorder and group lawlessness,” during which states should be permitted to retain
the broader concept of the co-conspirator exception. Brief of Attorney General of Georgia,
supra note 110, at *22.
120
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Dutton, supra note 99, at 18. In oral
argument in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), Justice Fortas suggested that
systemic impact would be a valid legal consideration, noting that if the problem arose in
“most trials in which there are co-defendants that’s one thing[,] if we’re talking about a small
percentage of them that’s another thing.” Oral Argument of Solicitor General Griswold at
38:26, Bruton, 391 U.S. 123 (No. 705), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/705. The Solicitor
General denied that the prosecution’s proposed approach to the Confrontation Clause was
“just a matter of expediency in getting . . . convictions.” Id. at 25:44.
121
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Dutton, supra note 99, at 8–9. “[H]abeas
corpus litigation ha[d] increased enormously,” and “difficult problems in [federal judicial]
administration ha[d] arisen by virtue of the sheer bulk of such litigation.” Id. at 27–28. A
vocal legal community insisted that “unavoidable practical considerations” warranted “restraint”
in the Court’s enforcement of confrontation’s rule of production. Id. at 28. State prosecutors
also cited court congestion as a significant reason to reverse cases like Pointer. See, e.g.,
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[might] well result if every litigant who is dissatisfied with state resolution of evidentiary matters may automatically term the alleged violation a ‘Sixth Amendment
Confrontation issue’ and obtain collateral relief in the federal courts.”122
Although some still conceded that production was confrontation’s elemental
command,123 the Court began to emphasize substantive reliability over procedural
compliance. In 1970, in California v. Green, the Court recast Pointer and Barber as
opinions that addressed only the right to cross-examination, ignoring those aspects
of the opinions that addressed the prosecutorial burden of production.124 The Court
described Pointer as a decision based upon the defendant’s right to cross-examine
the witness and not upon the prosecutorial failure to produce the witness that made
cross-examination impossible.125 Similarly, the Court insisted that Barber depended
not upon the prosecution’s failure to meet its burden of production, but upon the
consequence of the prosecution’s non-production: the defendant’s inability to crossexamine the absent witness.126
Soon, the Court abandoned its commitment to confrontation as a rule that regulated the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, and insisted instead that the purpose
of the Confrontation Clause was to make the declarant available to the defendant to
cross-examine and place him before the trier of fact in order to afford the jury the
occasion to weigh the demeanor of the witness.127 As a first step in this retreat, the
Court expanded the exceptions it had so carefully delineated in Mattox. In dicta in
Green, the Court replaced the “witness incapacity” rule with a less rigorous, more
expansive “unavailable to the government” standard.128 The Court held that if the
defense had cross-examined a government witness at a preliminary hearing, then that
testimony was admissible “wholly apart from the question of whether respondent had
an effective opportunity for confrontation at the subsequent trial.”129
Brief of the District Attorney of Monroe County, New York, as Amicus Curiae, supra note
116, at 4.
122
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Dutton, supra note 99, at 28.
123
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause . . . reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce any available
witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial.” (emphasis omitted)); Brief of
the United States as Amicus Curiae, Green, supra note 99, at 7 (“At its most elemental, the
[Confrontation] [C]lause requires that all the evidence submitted to the fact-finder be submitted in open court, during trial, with the accused having the opportunity to attend.”).
124
Green, 399 U.S. at 155–56.
125
Id. at 165–67 (stating that the State’s failure to produce its witness against Pointer would
not have violated the Confrontation Clause if Pointer had had “a full-fledged [preliminary]
hearing” with “counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to crossexamine” (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965))).
126
Id. at 162–63.
127
Id. at 195 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128
See id. at 165 (majority opinion). The Court also referred to those as witnesses who
were “physically unproducible.” Id. at 167.
129
Id. at 165.
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The Green Court excused prosecutorial non-production whenever the prosecution
could demonstrate the government’s inability to produce the witness.130 Although
the Court continued to note that “the particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the practice of trying defendants on ‘evidence’ which consisted solely
of ex parte affidavits or depositions,”131 Motes’s admonition that “testimony for the
people in criminal cases [could] only, as a general rule, be given by witnesses in court,
at the trial,” was fast receding.132
The 1972 case of Mancusi v. Stubbs133 demonstrated the Court’s growing sympathies for the difficulties that the Confrontation Clause imposed upon prosecutors. In
Mancusi, the Court permitted the prosecution to assume rather than prove the
unavailability of a foreign witness.134 Suddenly, the prosecution could avoid its burden of production simply by asserting that production would be impossible.135 Later
that year, the Dutton plurality suggested that the Confrontation Clause was simply
a rule of evidentiary reliability:
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the
Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by
assuring that “the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.”136
Production and examination of a live witness was simply the traditional means by
which trials had provided such a basis.
130

Id. at 167 & n.16 (“As long as the State has made a good-faith effort to produce the
witness, the actual presence or absence of the witness cannot be constitutionally relevant for
purposes of the ‘unavailability’ exception.”).
131
Id. at 156–57. Dislocating the basic value of production, the Court instead indicated
that witness production was required because it:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath—thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against
the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness
to submit to cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth’; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
Id. at 158 (footnote omitted).
132
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472 (1900) (emphasis added).
133
408 U.S. 204 (1972).
134
Id. at 212–13.
135
A plurality of the Court was prepared to eliminate the unavailability doctrine. In the 1970
case of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), four Justices argued that the prosecution should
be permitted to introduce testimonial statements made by an absent witness even if the prosecution could easily have produced the witness to testify at trial. Id. at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
136
Id. at 89 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161).
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By 1974, when the Court decided Davis v. Alaska,137 the Court had fully embraced the notion that the “main and essential purpose” of the Confrontation Clause
was “to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.”138 Reliability
of verdicts was the “true” goal of the Confrontation Clause.139 The Court viewed
production, without cross-examination, as a pointless procedural game.140 Absent
cross-examination, the production mandate merely facilitated a defendant’s “idle
purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him.”141
Even this cross-examination centered view of the Confrontation Clause was shortlived, producing a doctrine that completely undermined any remaining production
imperative. Having established that reliability was the goal of the Confrontation Clause,
it required only a modest extension for the Court to conclude that reliable evidence
could satisfy the Confrontation Clause, without production, confrontation, or crossexamination. In 1980, in Ohio v. Roberts,142 the Court formally embraced a theory
of the Confrontation Clause in which the admissibility of out-of-court statements
turned on their reliability.
Following the trend established in Green, Roberts expanded the “unavailability”
doctrine.143 Mattox had permitted the admission of a witness’s prior sworn testimony
if the witness was incapable of testifying; and, the witness’s prior testimony satisfied
procedural requisites that marked the declaration with “trustworthiness.”144 Green had
replaced the witness incapacity requirement with a requirement that the government
demonstrate good-faith efforts to produce the witness,145 and Stubbs had eliminated
137

415 U.S. 308 (1974).
Id. at 315–16 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 109, at
§ 1395, p. 123). At this time, Professor Wigmore’s treatise on evidence became increasingly
influential. That treatise urged that “the main and essential purpose” of the Confrontation
Clause “is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, supra note 109, at § 1395, pp. 123–25. According to Wigmore, the “personal appearance of the witness” was a second and “subordinate” goal of the Confrontation Clause,
designed to permit the judge and the jury to see and hear the witness, and assess the witness’s
credibility. Id. at pp. 125–26. In this recounting of confrontation’s purpose, the Confrontation
Clause’s command that a defendant be “confronted with the witnesses against him,” was
nothing more than a poorly worded means of guaranteeing the right to cross-examination.
Id. at § 1397, p. 127 (emphasis omitted).
139
See Davis, 415 U.S. at 315–16.
140
Id. at 315 (quoting WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 109, at § 1365, p. 123). In Davis,
the Court insisted that cross-examination was the Confrontation Clause’s core promise; the
rule of production was “a subordinate and incidental advantage” to the defendant. See id.
141
Id. at 315–16 (emphasis added) (quoting WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 109, at
§ 1395, p. 123).
142
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
143
Id.
144
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
145
See Brief of Respondent at 30, Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (No. 78-756), 1979 WL 197585.
138
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even the requirement of good-faith efforts when considering the statements of a
foreign witness.146
First, the Roberts Court eased the prosecution’s burden even further under the
“unavailability” prong of the Confrontation Clause test, requiring only that the
prosecution “demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant.”147 Then, the Roberts Court eased the requirements of the second prong of the test: that the out-of-court statement have been made
under circumstances that demonstrated its trustworthiness.148 The Roberts Court held
that there was no need for procedural requisites such as the oath, confrontation, or
cross-examination; instead, the prosecution could establish the necessary trustworthiness of the statement(s) through a showing of any “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”149 Among the “adequate ‘indicia of reliability’” were the “firmly rooted
hearsay exception[s],”150 authorizing the prosecution to use hearsay in lieu of the
live testimony of a competent and capable witness.151
Tellingly, the Roberts Court characterized confrontation’s mandate of production as
a mere “preference for face-to-face confrontation.”152 The Court had thoroughly abandoned confrontation’s production mandate and its corresponding commitment to confrontation’s procedural role in constitutional criminal procedure. For the next twenty-five
years the Court’s Confrontation Clause cases largely “turned on the question of reliability.”153 The Court’s nineteenth century cases had affirmed that “the primary object”
of the Confrontation Clause was to enforce a procedural demand to live testimony rather
than “depositions or ex parte affidavits.”154 The Court’s twentieth century cases treated
witness production as nothing more than one means to assure reliable verdicts.
In two subsequent cases, United States v. Inadi155 and White v. Illinois,156 the Court
delivered a death blow to confrontation’s production mandate. First, in Inadi, the Court
held that statements made by a co-conspirator “while the conspiracy is in progress” have
“independent evidentiary significance of [their] own.”157 Accordingly, cross-examination would not add to the jury’s understanding of those statements or increase the
146

Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65; see also Douglass, supra note 34, at 1801 & n.11 (citing
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–57 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399–
400 (1986)).
148
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56.
149
Id. at 66.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
153
Douglass, supra note 34, at 1847 n.218.
154
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–19 (1965) (quoting Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895)).
155
475 U.S. 387 (1986).
156
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
157
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394–95.
147

2016]

CONFRONTATION AS A RULE OF PRODUCTION

1017

reliability of the trial verdict.158 As a result, the Court held that unavailability was no
longer a precondition to the admission of out-of-court statements made by an absent coconspirator.159
In White, the Court formally abandoned any requirement of unavailability,
regardless of the type of statement at issue. Relying on the Roberts canard that the
Constitution expressed not a mandate but a “preference for live testimony,” the
Court scrambled away from any notion of a procedural Confrontation Clause.160 The
White Court did not simply deny that confrontation’s rule of production required an
unavailability standard; rather, it denied that confrontation required any production
of reliable witnesses.161 In support of this position, the Court asserted that a rule of
production was not likely, in and of itself, “to produce much testimony that adds
meaningfully to the trial’s truth-determining process”;162 accordingly, the Constitution did not require witness production. Instead, a trial court could admit a nontestifying witness’s out-of-court statements so long as, without cross-examination,
the jury could return a reliable verdict.163
To arrive at this astonishing elimination of both confrontation’s burden and
confrontation’s privileges, the White Court engaged in extraordinary jurisprudential
gymnastics, conflating confrontation’s rule of production with a defendant’s right
to compulsory process. The White Court insisted that any Confrontation Clause
error occasioned by its eradication of the unavailability rule could be cured by the
defendant’s invocation of his Compulsory Process Clause right.164 Any important
witness would be “subpoenaed by the prosecution or defense, regardless of any
Confrontation Clause requirement.”165 If the prosecution failed to produce that
important witness, “the Compulsory Process Clause and evidentiary rules . . . will
aid defendants in obtaining [that witness’s] live testimony.”166 This reading of confrontation’s rule of production rendered the clause superfluous; the Compulsory
Process Clause would serve just as well. In this upside-down interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause, the unavailability requirement simply reflected “the importance of cross-examination.”167 Since “the Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion of the ‘integrity of the factfinding process,’” any evidence that
would further that process should be admissible.168
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

White, 502 U.S. at 356–57 (discussing Inadi).
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392.
White, 502 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 354.
See id.
Id. at 355.
Id. (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396–98 (1986)).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 356–57 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)).
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After White, the Court viewed the Confrontation Clause as a rule of reliability.
Even the defendant’s right to cross-examination could be “mooted” if the admission
of an out-of-court statement was in “substantial compliance” with the reliabilitybased goals of the Confrontation Clause.169 In this Confrontation-Clause-as-a-ruleof-reliability jurisprudence, witness production and cross-examination were just two
of many methods that could comply with the Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause had been severed from its procedural moorings and joined, instead, to
substantive questions about evidentiary reliability.170
Inadi and White marked the Court’s most explicit acknowledgements that its
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was driven by costs, not the Constitution.
Unsurprisingly, those opinions coincided with an explosion in legal commentary
and argument emphasizing the dire consequences of burdening the prosecution with
confrontation’s requirement of witness production. The Inadi Court was particularly
concerned with the costs that the production mandate imposed on the prosecution:
[A]n unavailability rule places a significant practical burden on
the prosecution. In every case involving co-conspirator statements,
the prosecution would be required to identify with specificity
each declarant, locate those declarants, and then endeavor to ensure their continuing availability for trial . . . or run the risk of a
court determination that its efforts to produce the declarant did
not satisfy the test of “good faith.”171
The Inadi Court also worried about systemic costs to other law enforcement institutions: “Where declarants are incarcerated there is the burden on prison officials
and marshals of transporting them to and from the courthouse, as well as the increased
risk of escape.”172
At oral argument in Inadi, the Solicitor General’s first substantive claim was
that “this may be the most important criminal procedure case” of his tenure in
169

Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 557 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
True, the Court paid lip service to the rule of production. It conceded that public confrontation enhanced the legitimacy of case outcomes. Id. at 540 (majority opinion) (noting
that, in “a system of criminal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails,” the Confrontation Clause guarantees that “convictions will not be based on the
charges of unseen and unknown—and hence unchallengeable—individuals”). The Supreme
Court acknowledged “society’s interest in having the accused and accuser engage in an open
and even contest in a public trial,” id., and the jury’s interest in “observ[ing] the demeanor
of the witness in making his statement,” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). But
the Court’s holdings were clear: reliability mooted production.
171
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399 (1986).
172
Id.; accord Douglass, supra note 24, at 247 (noting that White and Inadi relieved the
government of its obligation of “produc[ing] all available hearsay declarants” in order to avoid
“substantial, and largely unnecessary, burdens on the courts and on the government” that would
be caused by a requirement of production).
170
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office.173 Why? Because if the Court required prosecutorial witness production, the
“effect on the allocation of criminal justice system resources would be dramatic.”174
The Solicitor General protested that enforcing confrontation’s production mandate
and excluding the out-of-court statements of an absent prosecution witness whenever the prosecution “has been negligent” would be an unwarranted “windfall” for
the defendant.175 Prosecutors argued that, as a net result of outcome and resource
costs, enforcement of confrontation’s burden of production “would prevent the efficient and effective prosecution” of criminal defendants.176 The Court agreed.177
In emphasizing production’s outcome costs, prosecutors, courts, and commentators stressed that these costs would be particularly high in cases of rape, child abuse, or
domestic violence, or in cases requiring the testimony of co-conspirators. For example,
the lead prosecutor in White conceded that if “the State . . . feel[s] that the witness
would not be exceptionally effective,” the State will attempt to rely instead, on the
witness’s affidavit or other out-of-court statement.178 In those circumstances, more
than any other, prosecutors urged the Court to relieve them of the burden of witness
production.179 Additionally, the Solicitor General in Inadi argued that, if “[n]obody
thought [the cooperator] would make a credible witness,” the prosecution should be
allowed to rely on the witness’s out-of-court affidavit rather than call the witness to
testify at trial, where the defense could examine him and the jury could evaluate his
credibility.180 These arguments urging limitation of confrontation’s outcome costs were
not covert or subtle. Prosecutors essentially conceded their position: the Court should
limit confrontation’s production mandate in order to increase conviction rates.181
The call for eliminating production to increase the likelihood of conviction took
on strong emotional overtones as prosecutors invoked the unique unreliability of
particularly vulnerable victims, such as children who had allegedly been sexually
abused. The White prosecution warned that “conviction [rates] for child sex abuse
173

Oral Argument at 01:16, Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (No. 84-1580), https://www.oyez.org
/cases/1985/84-1580.
174
Id. at 01:29.
175
Id. at 17:30.
176
Brief for Respondent, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113), 1991 WL
527595, at *25–26.
177
White, 502 U.S. 346.
178
Oral Argument at 27:39, White, 502 U.S. 346 (No. 90-6113), https://www.oyez.org
/cases/1991/90-6113.
179
Justice Blackmun’s 1986 dissent in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), offers another
illustration of a cost-based Confrontation Clause analysis. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun
worried about the “significant costs” of forcing the prosecution either to immunize the
declarant or forgo use of his testimony. Id. at 547–57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Given perceived outcome and crime control costs, Justice Blackmun was prepared to relieve the prosecution of its burden of producing the witness. Id. at 550.
180
Oral Argument, supra note 173, at 20:12.
181
See generally id.
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cases will remain low unless the prosecution is able to . . . use . . . a child’s out-of-court
statements,” instead of calling the child to testify.182
Worried that these witnesses might present testimony that was too “obviously
inaccurate or inadequate” to support a conviction, Illinois urged the Supreme Court
to eliminate confrontation’s rule of production.183 The argument was nothing less
than a claim that confrontation’s imperative should yield to the prosecution’s desire
to present the testimony of problematic witnesses through affidavits, depositions, or
hearsay, never fearing that a jury might acquit because a prosecution witness “broke
down, cried, ignored questions [or] eventually refused to answer.”184 A prosecutorial
failure of proof was re-characterized—rather than a constitutionally mandated
acquittal, this failure of proof was a loss for society: “the abuser . . . goes free because, without the child’s testimony, the evidence is insufficient to convict him.”185 The
Confrontation Clause was characterized as “a looming disruption” that would
“frustrate the operation of . . . statutes designed to ease the trauma suffered by child
victims . . . [and] to aid the prosecutors in bringing . . . sexual abusers to justice.”186
Similarly, in White, the prosecution insisted, and the Supreme Court agreed, that
production “impose[s] substantial additional burdens on the factfinding process.”187
Production would require the prosecution “to repeatedly locate and keep continuously available each declarant.”188 Adding insult to this perceived injury, confrontation’s rule of production required witnesses to come to court “even when neither the
prosecution nor the defense has any interest in calling the witness to the stand.”189
Prosecutors fanned the flames of the Court’s worst fears about expending prosecutorial resources, demanding:
182

Brief for Respondent, supra note 176, at *25–26. For example, an alleged victim might
refuse to comply with the prosecution’s subpoena. Since victim-witnesses were particularly
likely to forget “details, change[ ] stories, or present[ ] inconsistent facts,” calling them to the
witness stand might undermine the likelihood of conviction. Id. at *21–22 (quoting State v.
Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (N.J. 1984)). Prosecutors conceded that these witnesses were
often prone to freezing in court or remaining silent because their “emotional condition prevents [them] from testifying” at all. Id. (quoting Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1333).
183
Id. at *21–22 (quoting Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1333).
184
Id. (quoting Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1333).
185
Michael B. Wixom, Comment, Videotaping the Testimony of an Abused Child: Necessary
Protection for the Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant’s Constitutional
Rights?, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 461, 465–66 (1986).
186
John A. Mayers, Note, Coy v. Iowa: A Constitutional Right of Intimidation, 16 PEPP.
L. REV. 709, 710–11 (1989).
187
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 (1992) (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
398–99 (1986)). Since the Confrontation Clause occupies a central place in the Bill of
Rights, one wonders precisely what “additional” burden is imposed by enforcing a two-century-old right.
188
Id.
189
Id.
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[W]hat happens if we have trouble identifying who the declarant is,
or if we have difficulty in locating a declarant who may have made
a declaration five years ago that we want to introduce[?] We may
not know where he is, how far do we have to go to locate him[?]190
Accepting the validity of these arguments, the Court rationalized eliminating
confrontation’s burden of production because witness production would “likely . . .
impose substantial additional burdens on the factfinding process” by requiring the
prosecution to “locate and keep continuously available each declarant.”191 Moreover,
the Court was loathe to adopt a rule that required routine judicial assessments of the
declarant’s availability, since it would “impose a substantial burden on the entire
criminal justice system.”192 In the end, the Court was unwilling to insist upon the
costs associated with confrontation’s production imperative. So, the Court introduced
a new, extra-constitutional value—prosecutorial resource conservation.193
A still broader—and more speculative—conversation about systemic costs linked
production enforcement to decreases in the deterrent effects of prosecution, “unnecessary” victim trauma,194 and the increased commission of crime. Legislatures sought
to limit the confrontation mandate in child abuse cases “with two broad purposes in
mind: ‘to reduce trauma to the child and to facilitate successful prosecution of child
molesters.’”195 When states enacted hearsay exceptions for child witnesses, the
190

Oral Argument, supra note 173, at 25:33; see id. at 24:27 (noting that, although the
prosecution might “know who [those witnesses] are, and . . . where they can be found[,] . . . a
lot of them will be in jail, and producing them will be quite a costly and burdensome exercise,”
and “even if they are not in jail, [prosecutors] can subpoena them” only to “find that they have
gone fishing, or that they had car trouble, or that they are sick, and they may not appear in
response to the subpoena”).
191
White, 502 U.S. at 355. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Melendez-Diaz.
See infra notes 258–62 and accompanying text.
192
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 399.
193
Id. at 398. The Court also noted that “the burden imposed by . . . requiring a determination of availability . . . automatically adds another avenue of appellate review in these
complex cases.” Id.
194
See, e.g., Oral Argument, supra note 178, at 28:03 (arguing that the Court should
excuse non-production “in the case of small children” as “the prosecutor would want to keep
the child from being put in a traumatic situation”). Some argued that, “[i]f required to testify in
court in front of defendant, each child would have to undergo therapeutic intervention to repair
the damage brought by simply testifying in that setting.” Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Note,
Videotaping Children’s Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809, 829 n.91 (1987)
(quoting State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371, 1375 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)). Child advocates urged
that the Court “engage in an analysis which balances the competing interests of the child and
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Bruce E. Bohlman, The High Cost of Constitutional
Rights in Child Abuse Cases—Is the Price Worth Paying?, 66 N.D. L. REV. 579, 585 (1990).
195
Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695 (1993) (quoting
Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 69 (Ind. 1987)).
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“chief purpose” of those statutes was “to enhance the effectiveness of the state’s
proof.”196 Commentators insisted that witness production was harmful to society
because, “as a result of the child’s inability to testify, a guilty perpetrator [will be]
improperly released.”197 To them, the requirement of in-court testimony produced
“useless prosecutions which waste court resources, prevent treatment of true sex
offenders, and hurt the integrity of the judicial system.”198 Again, the Supreme Court
concurred, limiting the form of confrontation’s mandate in cases involving child
witnesses.199
In sum, the Court had weighed the value of confrontation’s burden of production against the “costs” of constitutional enforcement. In its eagerness to constrain
confrontation’s costs, the Court put its thumb firmly on the scales against production. The Court denied that there was any value in production for its own sake.200
Weighed against the “cost” of a defendant’s acquittal, confrontation’s production
mandate offered only “marginal protection to the defendant”;201 according to the
Court, production’s costs to the prosecution easily outweighed confrontation’s
“marginal protection.”202 The prosecution’s burden of production had been fully
buried by the Court.
III. CRAWFORD AND ITS PROGENY: RHETORIC AND RETREAT
In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court reversed course, rejecting Roberts, Inadi, and White. The Crawford opinion established confrontation
as a rule of production; however, post-Crawford opinions renounced this command.
Following Crawford, the Supreme Court endorsed notice-and-demand provisions
that were designed solely to minimize the prosecution’s burden of production. As
a result, criminal defendants must formally demand the prosecutorial production of
witnesses, or forfeit forever their Confrontation Clause protections. Crawford’s
rhetoric is different than Roberts’s, but the result has been the same: the Supreme
Court undermines and under-enforces confrontation’s rule of production.203
196

Id. at 693, 696 n.18 (noting “[t]here can be no doubt . . . that facilitating successful
prosecutions is an important goal” of legislative reforms addressing witness production).
197
Hill & Hill, supra note 194, at 827.
198
Id. at 827 n.80 (citing Dustin P. Ordway, Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial
Without Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 133, 148 n.79 (1981)).
199
Following Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), state courts issued multiple opinions
holding that “protection of children is a valid public policy to justify a denial of face-to-face
confrontation.” Bohlman, supra note 194, at 588.
200
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986).
201
Id. at 399.
202
Id.
203
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the Court’s decision to exclude nontestimonial statements from confrontation’s ambit. For a thorough critique of that decision, see
Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865 (2012).
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A. Crawford and the Rule of Production
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court reversed nearly twenty-five years
of production-avoiding case law generated by Ohio v. Roberts. With Justice Scalia
writing for the majority, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause requires the
prosecution to produce its testimonial witnesses at trial or forego any reliance on
those witnesses’ statements.204 Crawford returned to a Confrontation Clause that
“guarantees a defendant’s right to confront those ‘who “bear testimony”’ against
him.”205 Under Crawford, confrontation once again required prosecutorial witness
production: “A witness’s testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless
the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”206
Crawford insisted that confrontation mandates a very particular type of trial
procedure.207 Proof of the reliability of the prosecution’s evidence fails to satisfy
confrontation’s demand.208 Rather, the Confrontation Clause mandates a trial procedure in which the prosecution produces—at trial—witnesses who give testimony
and are subject to cross-examination in the presence of the defendant, judge, and
jury.209 This commitment to confrontation’s production mandate means that the
prosecution must produce its testimonial witnesses at trial, even if those witnesses
have already been thoroughly cross-examined by the defense.210 In short, Crawford
established confrontation as “a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”211
Nevertheless, Crawford maintained that the Confrontation Clause was a procedure designed to increase the substantive reliability of trial verdicts.212 The Court
insisted that the Confrontation Clause’s “ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence.”213 Prosecutorial production was simply the constitutionally mandated
means of obtaining that end; and Crawford reinforced the Confrontation Clause
accordingly.214 However, as set forth below, even this production-promoting Crawford
doctrine was not long-lived.
Crawford produced an enormous outcry. Police, prosecutors, and politicians
joined legal commentators in bemoaning Crawford’s costs.215 With complaints that
204

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009) (quoting Crawford, 541
U.S. at 51).
206
Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
207
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
208
Id. at 61.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 59.
211
Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
See, e.g., Daniel Huff, Confronting Crawford, 85 NEB. L. REV. 417, 452 (2006) (“There
is a real cost to prosecutors in complying with Crawford.”).
205
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echoed the arguments raised in cases like Inadi and White, Crawford’s detractors
argued that enforcing a production mandate would bankrupt state prosecutors.216
They complained that Crawford would have “particularly profound implications for
domestic violence cases.”217 They worried about the possibility that enforcement of
the Confrontation Clause might impair national security.218
Following Crawford, prosecutors, courts, and commentators began to express
particular concerns that requiring production of testimonial forensic witnesses
would have made it harder for the prosecution to obtain convictions.219 In three
216

Id.
Michael R. Dreeben, Prefatory Article: The Confrontation Clause, the Law of Unintended Consequences, and the Structure of Sixth Amendment Analysis, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC., at iii, xxix (2005) (noting, with concern, that “between eighty and ninety percent
of domestic violence victims recant their accusations or refuse to cooperate with a prosecution”
and arguing that a production mandate would hinder the prosecution of their abusers (quoting
Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 807 (D.C. 2005)); see also Stancil, 866 A.2d at 807 (expressing concern that Crawford might prevent prosecutors from “go[ing] forward with domestic
violence prosecutions without the alleged victim’s cooperation or testimony,” since those prosecutions had previously depended upon “out-of-court statements made by the alleged victims,
or by other eyewitnesses”); G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford
and Melendez-Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 80–90 (2009) (summarizing concerns about
a rule of production that would require a “traumatized” witness to testify in court).
218
Fenner, supra note 217, at 87 (referring to “national-security criminal prosecutions
where the state has a compelling interest in keeping secrets and . . . keeping the operative off
the stand” and “terrorism cases where the government has a compelling interest” in using outof-court statements).
219
See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing with approval
a discussion of society’s interests in permitting prosecutions to proceed without testimonial
forensics witnesses); People v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 351 (Kan. 2005) (noting that, in a
murder prosecution, requiring the prosecution to produce the author of an autopsy report
would “have the effect of requiring the pathologist who performed the autopsy to testify in
every criminal proceeding,” and expressing concern that if the “medical examiner is deceased
or otherwise unavailable,” a mandate of production would produce a “harsh and unnecessary”
rule precluding the State “from using the autopsy report in presenting its case, which could
preclude the prosecution of a homicide case”), overruled by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317
(Kan. 2007); State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (bemoaning
the “palpable” burden that would be placed on “[l]aboratory technicians . . . and hospital
workers . . . [who] would need to divert from their regular functions, in testing substances and
treating sick people, and travel to courthouses to vouch for the contents of their certified
reports”); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (“Certainly it would
be against society’s interests to permit the unavailability of the medical examiner who prepared the report to preclude the prosecution of a homicide case.”), abrogated by People v.
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008); Thomas F. Burke III, The Test Results Said What?
The Post-Crawford Admissibility of Hearsay Forensic Evidence, 53 S.D. L. REV. 1, 22
(2008) (“[C]ourts have exhibited considerable reluctance” to consider Breathalyzer certifications as testimonial evidence, “realizing that such a holding would seriously impede the
State’s prosecution of drunk driving offenses (namely, by requiring that maintenance technicians appear in court for nearly every drunk driving case that goes to trial).”).
217
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opinions regarding the production of forensic evidence, a deeply divided Court
quickly retreated from Crawford’s production imperative, returning to the substantive reliability questions that dominated the post-incorporation Confrontation
Clause opinions.220
B. The Forensic Trilogy’s Retreat
In its trilogy of forensic post-Crawford cases, the Supreme Court grappled with
questions of confrontation’s production obligation. Each case considered whether the
Confrontation Clause requires the production of the forensic or scientific expert who
prepared or analyzed an out-of-court forensic report.221 In two of these cases—
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and Bullcoming v. New Mexico—a narrow majority
of the Court ostensibly upheld confrontation’s production mandate.222 In the third
case—Williams v. Illinois—no single view of confrontation captured a majority; instead,
a fractured Court openly struggled with the uncomfortable consequences of a strong
production mandate.223 Together, these cases demonstrate that the Court has failed
to fully divorce itself from the substantive considerations that dominated its Roberts-era
jurisprudence. These cases illustrate two trends: first, notwithstanding Crawford’s
rhetoric, the Supreme Court remains deeply ambivalent about confrontation as a
rule of production; second, the Court’s ambivalence is lodged in the same cost considerations that drove its pre-Crawford jurisprudence.
1. Melendez-Diaz
In Melendez-Diaz, a deeply divided Court debated whether confrontation’s rule
of production required the prosecution to produce the authors of testimonial forensic reports.224 On its face, Melendez-Diaz presented the narrow question of whether,
in a prosecution for cocaine distribution, the Confrontation Clause precluded the
admission of forensic analysis affidavits without live testimony by the declarants.225
Massachusetts law authorized the prosecution to introduce forensic certificates of
analysis as “prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of
the narcotic . . . analyzed,” without requiring that the prosecution’s forensic declarant
testify in court.226
220

The following opinions are referred to as the post-incorporation Confrontation Clause
opinions: Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307 (2009).
221
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
222
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329.
223
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
224
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 309 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2007)).
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Ostensibly, the unanimous opinion in Crawford had mooted any consideration
of the reliability of testimonial evidence.227 Yet, Melendez-Diaz produced a lengthy
debate about whether production and cross-examination of a forensic witness would
increase the accuracy of a trial outcome.228 Notwithstanding its straightforward
application of Crawford, the Melendez-Diaz majority continued to debate the dissent’s
assertion that producing forensic witnesses provided a meaningful opportunity to
test the accuracy of the evidence and the declarant’s “honesty, proficiency, and
methodology.”229 This debate marked a significant re-engagement with the recently
abandoned theory of confrontation as a rule of reliability.
The Melendez-Diaz majority stressed that prosecutorial witness production was
a non-negotiable mandate of the Confrontation Clause.230 It did so, however, as an
act of textual fealty. For the majority, the Confrontation Clause established confrontation as an essential and exorable procedural component of a valid conviction.231
The majority explained that, although there might be “other ways—and in some cases
better ways—to challenge or verify” the accuracy of the prosecution’s evidence, “the
Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation” of witnesses at trial.232 Prosecutorial
witnesses must be made available for confrontation even if they have “the scientific
acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.”233 The Melendez-Diaz
majority affirmed that legislatures and courts “do not have license to suspend the
Confrontation Clause,” even if “a preferable trial strategy is available.”234
Shoring up its validation of Melendez-Diaz’s confrontation claim, the majority
explained that the adversarial structure of the Sixth Amendment places the risk of
“adverse-witness no-shows” upon the prosecution.235 Shifting that risk to the accused violates the core structural protections of the Confrontation Clause.236 After
all, “the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its
witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”237
Therefore, the clause’s “value to the defendant is not replaced by a system in which
the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses.”238 Massachusetts’s statutory scheme
227

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309.
229
Id. at 321.
230
Id. at 324.
231
Id. at 325.
232
Id. at 318.
233
Id. at 319 n.6.
234
Id. at 318; accord Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The ‘necessities of trial and the adversary process’ are irrelevant [to questions about confrontation], since they cannot alter the constitutional text.”).
235
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
236
Id. at 324–25
237
Id. at 324.
238
Id. at 324–25.
228
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violated the Constitution when it “[c]onvert[ed] the prosecution’s duty under the
Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause.”239
The majority never fully addressed the due process implications of production
as a confrontation-essential imperative. Instead, the majority returned, again and
again, to the question of whether forensic evidence is per se reliable, or “uniquely
immune from the risk of manipulation.”240 The majority stressed that forensic witnesses might “face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of
expediency . . . or have an incentive . . . to alter the evidence in a manner favorable
to the prosecution.”241 “[U]nder oath in open court,” a dishonest analyst might
“reconsider his false testimony.”242 The majority also emphasized the role of crossexamination in “weed[ing] out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent
one” or the one who lacks “proper training or [has a] deficiency in judgment.”243 All
of these arguments focused on the reliability of the evidence rather than the mandate
that the prosecution produce a live witness to offer that evidence.
The dissenting Justices urged a return to confrontation as a rule of reliability,
at least where forensic evidence was concerned.244 Alleging that forensic evidence
was likely to be highly reliable, the dissenters argued that its reliability excused
prosecutorial non-production and suspended the defense right to confrontation and
cross-examination.245 Because “[t]he Confrontation Clause is not designed, and does
not serve, to detect errors in scientific tests,” prosecutors should not be required to
produce these scientific witnesses.246 Unwilling to abandon a reliability-centered
Confrontation Clause they insisted that, unless Melendez-Diaz “dispute[d] the
authenticity of the samples tested or the accuracy of the tests performed,” production simply “transforms the Confrontation Clause from a sensible procedural protection into a distortion of the criminal justice system.”247
239

Id. at 324.
Id. at 318.
241
Id. (citation omitted).
242
Id. at 319 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988)).
243
Id. at 319–20.
244
Id. at 340 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245
Id. at 330.
246
Id. at 337; id. at 334 (“[A forensic analyst is] remote from the scene, has no personal
stake in the outcome, does not even know the accused, and is concerned only with the
performance of his or her role in conducting the test.”).
247
Id. at 338–39. The dissent also attempted to distinguish forensic analysts from other types
of testimonial witnesses. The dissent offered three distinctions: (1) “a conventional witness
recalls events observed in the past, while an analyst’s report contains near-contemporaneous
observations of the test”; (2) an “analyst’s distance from the crime and the defendant, in both
space and time, suggests the analyst is not a witness against the defendant in the conventional
sense”; and (3) the Melendez-Diaz analysts worked for the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health and so were not “adversarial” to the defendant. Id. at 345–46.
240
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Along with this return to a debate about evidentiary reliability, Melendez-Diaz
marked a return to an active debate about confrontation’s costs. Massachusetts asked the
Court “to relax the requirements of the Confrontation Clause to accommodate the
‘necessities of trial and the adversary process.’”248 Massachusetts and its supporters
urged that “the substantial total number of controlled-substance analyses performed by
state and federal laboratories in recent years” meant that a mandate for witness production would bankrupt law enforcement and weaken (or destroy) drug prosecutions.249
In his dissent, joined by Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Alito, Justice Kennedy focused
largely on “the costs the Court’s ruling will impose on state drug prosecutions.”250 The
dissenters worried that Melendez-Diaz’s mandate of witness production would
“disrupt if not end many prosecutions where guilt is clear”251 and would “put prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances
when a particular laboratory technician . . . simply does not or cannot appear.”252
In addition, the dissenters worried that Melendez-Diaz might cause “uncertainty
and disruption” in cases involving non-scientific declarants, such as doctors and bank
tellers.253 Burdening the prosecution with confrontation’s production mandate offered
these “negligible benefits,” particularly when weighted against the “costs [the
Melendez-Diaz] decision imposes on criminal trials” and the larger criminal justice
system.254 Witnesses might be forced to waste time waiting to be called at trial.255 In
sum, enforcement of confrontation would “impose[ ] enormous costs on the administration of justice.”256
Most shockingly, the dissenters complained about the “costs” of a Confrontation Clause that reinforced the Constitution’s acquittal bias:
The Court purchases its meddling with the Confrontation
Clause at a dear price, a price not measured in taxpayer dollars
alone. Guilty defendants will go free, on the most technical
grounds, as a direct result of today’s decision, adding nothing to
248

Id. at 325 (majority opinion) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 59, Melendez-Diaz, 557
U.S. 305 (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 4103864).
249
Id.
250
Id. at 341 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
251
Id. at 333.
252
Id. at 340–41 (“By requiring analysts also to appear in the far greater number of cases
where defendants do not dispute the analyst’s result, the Court imposes enormous costs on
the administration of justice.”).
253
Id. at 337.
254
Id. at 340–41.
255
Id. at 341–42 (noting that “[t]he analyst [might] face the prospect of waiting for days
in a hallway outside the courtroom,” because “[t]rial courts have huge caseloads to be processed within strict time limits”).
256
Id. at (arguing that “analysts responsible for testing the drugs at issue in those cases
now bear a crushing burden,” which will increase exponentially as a result of the MelendezDiaz ruling).
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the truth-finding process. The analyst will not always make it to
the courthouse in time. He or she may be ill; may be out of the
country; may be unable to travel because of inclement weather;
or may at that very moment be waiting outside some other courtroom for another defendant to exercise the right the Court invents
today. If for any reason the analyst cannot make it to the courthouse in time, then, the Court holds, the jury cannot learn of the
analyst’s findings . . . . The result, in many cases, will be that the
prosecution cannot meet its burden of proof, and the guilty
defendant goes free on a technicality that, because it results in an
acquittal, cannot be reviewed on appeal.257
The Melendez-Diaz majority ostensibly refused to consider these costs, noting,
“The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome,
but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—is
binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”258 Still, the majority
clearly took these cost concerns seriously. The majority devoted considerable ink to
refuting the possibility that witness production would come at a high cost.259 Although
the majority was ultimately convinced that “there is little reason to believe that our
decision today will commence the parade of horribles respondent and the dissent
predict,”260 it nevertheless took steps to assure that confrontation did not carry a high
systemic price. Having rejected the notion of equivalence between the Confrontation
and Compulsory Process Clauses, the majority reversed course and relied upon Compulsory Process jurisprudence to endorse the use of notice-and-demand statutes.261
In so doing, the majority tipped its hand: notwithstanding Crawford, the majority
remained unable—or unwilling—to fully embrace production as a procedural mandate with an independent adversarial role mandated by the Constitution. Hence, the
Melendez-Diaz majority offered its dangerous dicta: “States are free to adopt procedural rules,” such as notice-and-demand statutes, that require a defendant to make a
pretrial demand that the prosecution produce its witnesses or be deemed to have
waived, by silence, his confrontation rights.262
As will be discussed in Part IV, this notice-and-demand dicta began the Court’s
steady slide toward a new incursion on confrontation’s rule of production. By offering
notice-and-demand statutes as a “solution” to confrontation’s production “problem,”
the Court maintained a rhetorical commitment to Crawford’s creed while retreating
from Crawford’s consequences.
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id. at 342–43 (citation omitted).
Id. at 325 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., id. (“[T]he sky will not fall after today’s decision.”).
Id. at 328.
Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 327.
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2. Bullcoming
Melendez-Diaz provoked widespread hysteria about the effects of requiring the
prosecution to produce its forensic witnesses. Commentators complained that
“Melendez-Diaz makes prosecuting cases more difficult, more expensive, and, in
some circumstances, impossible.”263 They bemoaned that “[t]he burdens MelendezDiaz imposed on state prosecutions, [are] especially challenging during these dismal
economic times when state coffers are wanting.”264
Melendez-Diaz meant that prosecutors would incur “substantial financial burdens . . . to accommodate the travel necessities” of analysts who were no longer in the
jurisdiction.265 A prosecution might be stymied by the death of an analyst, producing
a “morally repulsive” outcome.266 Melendez-Diaz would make “some cases unprosecutable . . . [including] [p]articularly vulnerable . . . cases in which a crucial scientific
test cannot be duplicated and the analyst who conducted the test is unavailable.”267
Police and prosecutors worried about a potential increase in trials, the costs of producing forensic witnesses, and the likelihood of increasing numbers of acquittals and
dismissals.268 They claimed that “[f]orensic labs’ workloads [had] noticeably spiked
and certain states have been having problems producing analysts at trial in the wake
of Melendez-Diaz’s increased demands.”269 They complained that Melendez-Diaz
“unnecessarily divert[ed] taxpayer resources better spent on fighting and preventing
continued drug and other crimes.”270 At bottom, law enforcement and its advocates
objected to the structural costs of an adversary system that saddled the prosecution
with the burdens of production and persuasion:
263

Oliver M. Gold, Note, Trimming Confrontation’s Claws: Navigating the Uncertain
Jurisprudential Topography of the Post-Melendez-Diaz Confrontation Clause, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
264
Id. at 1448.
265
Id. at 1442.
266
Id. at 1443.
267
Christina Miller & Michael D. Ricciuti, Crawford Comes to the Lab: Melendez-Diaz
and the Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 53 BOS. B.J. 13, 15 (2009).
268
See, e.g., id. at 14 (noting the claim by Attorney General Martha Coakley, who argued
Melendez-Diaz in the Supreme Court, that Melendez-Diaz would require the dismissal of drug
cases because “arranging for the testimony of [drug] analysts at every drug prosecution is
‘virtually impossible with current staffing’”); Tom Jackman, Lab Analyst Decision Complicates Prosecutions: High Court Requires Scientists to Testify, WASH. POST, July 15, 2009,
at A16 (reporting prosecutors’ concerns that Melendez-Diaz will place an oppressive burden
on the state and speculating that the number of trials “could well go up”).
269
Gold, supra note 263, at 1444.
270
Brief of the States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1,
Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191), 2009 WL 3652660; id. at 6, 10–11
(arguing that Melendez-Diaz “impacts a high-volume, high-cost subset of criminal prosecutions,”
and expressing alarm at “the potential for skyrocketing costs associated with drug and other
forensic-evidence prosecutions”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 9–10, Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (No. 07-11191), 2009 WL 3615002 (same).
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Emboldened by the Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz, defendants
and their counsel have been increasingly unwilling to stipulate to
the admission of drug analysis certificates, even when they have
no intention or motivation to dispute the accuracy of that evidence.
Defendants and their counsel have instead adopted a wait-andsee strategy, insisting on the defendant’s constitutional right to
confrontation and hoping that the State will be unable to produce
a qualified analyst to testify at trial. If not, the prosecution is
forced either to seek a continuance to secure an analyst’s presence
at trial, present substitute evidence to prove the composition and
weight of the drugs, or agree to reduce, or even dismiss, the
charges against the defendant.271
Two years after Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered the forensic evidence case
of Bullcoming v. New Mexico.272 Bullcoming presented the relatively straightforward
question of whether the testimony of a surrogate analyst about a forensic certificate
would satisfy the Confrontation Clause.273 Bullcoming was “materially indistinguishable from the facts” of Melendez-Diaz274 except that the author of the forensic report
was on “unpaid leave” at the time of the trial, so the State offered the testimony of a
surrogate analyst.275 Bullcoming’s outcome seemed to be a foregone conclusion; the
laboratory report was testimonial evidence, therefore, the Confrontation Clause required that the prosecution produce its author. However, Bullcoming produced a
fractured opinion, one that revealed the Justices’ commitment to production as a
guarantor of cross-examination—not as an independent structural requirement.276
The Bullcoming majority reaffirmed Crawford’s promise that “fidelity to the Confrontation Clause” precludes the admission of testimonial statements by absent witnesses unless “the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine.”277 However, the majority’s focus remained on
cross-examination and its capacity to add reliability to trial outcomes.278 For example, the Court found that the absence of the report’s author was troubling since the
State had offered no explanation either for his “unpaid leave” or for the State’s
decision not to call him to the stand.279 If it had focused on the Confrontation Clause
271

Brief of the States of Indiana et al., supra note 270, at 23, 24. See Part IV infra for a
discussion of how these “costs” are at the adversarial core of American constitutional criminal procedure.
272
131 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2011).
273
Id. at 2710.
274
Id. at 2721.
275
Id. at 2711–12.
276
Id. at 2710.
277
Id. at 2713 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).
278
Id. at 2708.
279
Id.
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as a rule of production, the Court might have observed that the State’s failure to call
the forensic declarant was, in and of itself, a prosecutorial failure to meet its confrontation burden. Thus, Bullcoming treated the Confrontation Clause as a guarantee of the
right to cross-examination, not as a mandate for prosecutorial witness production.280
Again, the Court considered confrontation’s costs. The Bullcoming filings had been
replete with dire warnings about the consequences of confrontation’s production mandate. Witness production “would pull valuable analysts away from their underresourced
[sic] laboratories and . . . would stifle continued development and improvement of reliable and efficient evidence-processing.”281 The costs of constitutional enforcement
would include “more trials,” “unduly lenient plea bargains,” or meritless acquittals and
dismissals.282 “The State and its amici urge[d] that unbending application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence would impose an undue burden on the prosecution.”283 Once again, dissenting Justices agreed with those cost-conscious claims.
In an echo of the concerns that had influenced the Court’s pre-Crawford confrontation jurisprudence, the dissenters raised concerns about crime control, confrontation’s resource costs, and a blow to federalism.284 They insisted that “increases in
subpoenas [for drug analysts would] further impede the state laboratory’s ability to
keep pace with its obligations.”285 The demand for witness production would waste
“[s]carce state resources [that] could be committed to other urgent needs in the
criminal justice system.”286 Vulnerable victims would face increased risks and violent batterers would be unfairly acquitted or have their cases dismissed.287 Further,
Bullcoming disrupted the proper relationship between the state and federal government by “foreclos[ing] [states] from contributing to the formulation and enactment
of rules that make trials fairer and more reliable.”288
280

Id. (“[T]he Confrontation Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation
simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial
statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”).
281
Brief for the States of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876), 2011 WL 175867.
282
Id. at 8; see also Brief for National District Attorneys Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 27, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876), 2011 WL 175868
(expressing concern that as a result of Bullcoming’s claim, “in many murder prosecutions, the
prosecution would be left without the means of proving the manner and cause of death, . .
. a shocking result”).
283
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.
284
Id. at 2725–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
285
Id. at 2728.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 2727 (arguing that Bullcoming would undermine “recent state laws allowing
admission of well-documented and supported reports of abuse by women whose abusers later
murdered them”).
288
Id. (arguing that burdening the prosecution with confrontation’s production mandate
had caused “ongoing, continued, and systemic displacement of the States and dislocation of
the federal structure”).
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In response, the majority insisted that the Confrontation Clause was not amenable
to concerns of cost.289 Nevertheless it returned to the argument that “notice-and-demand
procedures, long in effect in many jurisdictions, can reduce burdens on forensic laboratories.”290 Once again the Court debated whether, in the “‘small fraction of . . . cases’
that ‘actually proceed to trial,’” confrontation’s costs were too high for enforcement.291 Thus the majority’s holding appears to rest, in part, upon its conclusion that
“the sky ha[d] not fallen” as a result of Melendez-Diaz and was unlikely to do so as
a result of Bullcoming.292
In Part IV of the majority’s opinion, Justices Ginsburg and Scalia rejected the
State’s suggestion that if a defendant wanted to challenge the forensic report, the
defendant should bear the burden of retesting the evidence: “[T]he Confrontation
Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the
defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”293 Moreover, confrontation
requires prosecutorial witness production “in every case, whether or not the defendant seeks to rebut the case against him.”294 Yet, in the next sentence, the Justices
once again urged a statutory “solution” to the prosecution’s production “problem,”
reminding the state that, “notice-and-demand statutes, long in effect in many jurisdictions, can reduce burdens on forensic laboratories.”295 This reference to noticeand-demand statutes undermines any claim that Part IV of the opinion sought to
enforce confrontation as a regulation of the means by which the prosecution must
meet its burden of proof.
3. Williams
In many ways, the 2012 case of Williams v. Illinois296 best exemplifies the
Court’s retreat to a confrontation analysis based on cross-examination and reliability, rather than one based on production as a procedural mandate. As a plurality
opinion, Williams lacks precedential value.297 However, each of its four opinions
demonstrates a focus on substantive reliability rather than procedural compliance.298
289

Id. at 2717–18 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2718.
291
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
325 (2009)).
292
Id. at 2719.
293
Id. at 2718 (alteration in original) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324).
294
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 n.14 (1988)).
295
Id.
296
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion).
297
See id.
298
Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion in which Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Chief
Justice Roberts joined. Id. at 2227. Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 2221.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning. Id.
Justice Kagan wrote a dissent in which Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Sotomayor joined. Id.
Justice Thomas, whose opinion maintained that the report was not testimonial and therefore
290
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Williams considered whether the Confrontation Clause required the prosecution
to produce the technician who performed a DNA test for cross-examination or whether
another analyst from the laboratory could be called to interpret the results of the
test.299 Justice Alito (for the plurality) and Justice Breyer (in a concurrence) both
argued that because the forensic report itself was reliable, the producer of the report
was exempt from confrontation’s rule of production.300 They also argued that DNA
reports were so accurate that they were exemplars of the types of evidence not
covered by the Confrontation Clause.301 The plurality found the possibility of error
“inconceivable.”302 It therefore concluded that it was “surely permissible for the trier
of fact to infer” that the report was reliable and therefore exempt from confrontation’s rule of production.303
Similarly, in his concurrence, Justice Breyer returned again and again to confrontation as a rule of cross-examination (substantive reliability) rather than a rule
of production (burden compliance).304 Justice Breyer characterized Williams as a
case asking whether the defendant could “cross-examine the individual or individuals who produced” a forensic report, not whether the prosecution could simply
decline to produce those individuals.305 Like Justice Alito, Justice Breyer speculated
that cross-examination would not improve the accuracy of the verdict and therefore
not subject to the Confrontation Clause, continued to measure the Confrontation Clause’s
applicability by reference to substantive reliability rather than procedural compliance. Id. at
2259–61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
299
Id. at 2227 (plurality opinion).
300
Id. at 2228. The Justices argued that the “report was produced before any suspect was
identified,” id., “there was no ‘prospect of fabrication’ [of the report] and no incentive to
produce anything other than a scientifically sound and reliable profile,” id. at 2244 (citing
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011)). There was “no real chance that ‘sample
contamination, sample switching, mislabeling, [or] fraud’ could have led Cellmark to
produce a DNA profile that falsely matched petitioner.” Id. (alteration in original)
(responding to Justice Kagan’s dissent directly).
301
Id. at 2239, 2244 (asserting that errors in DNA testing “may often be detected from the
[DNA] profile itself”; moreover, “how could shoddy or dishonest work in the Cellmark lab have
resulted in the production of a DNA profile that just so happened to match petitioner’s? If the
semen found on the vaginal swabs was not petitioner’s and thus had an entirely different DNA
profile, how could sloppy work in the Cellmark lab have transformed that entirely different profile into one that matched petitioner’s? And without access to any other sample of petitioner’s
DNA (and recall that petitioner was not even under suspicion at this time), how could a
dishonest lab technician have substituted petitioner’s DNA profile?” (footnote omitted)).
302
Id. at 2244.
303
Id. at 2239.
304
Id. at 2244–48 (Breyer, J., concurring).
305
Id. at 2244–45; see also id. at 2247 (discussing whether “cross-examination could
sometimes significantly help to elicit the truth”); id. at 2249 (discussing why “the need for
cross-examination is considerably diminished when the out-of-court statement was made by
an accredited laboratory employee”).
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was unnecessary.306 Based on the alleged inutility of cross-examination, Justice Breyer
concluded that the Confrontation Clause did not require witness production.307
Justices Alito and Breyer argued that enforcing confrontation as a rule of production would impose unjustifiable costs upon the criminal justice system.308 They
insisted that a rule of production would actually reduce the reliability of trial outcomes.309 Justice Alito framed Williams as a case about costs and “whether
Crawford substantially impedes the ability of prosecutors to introduce DNA evidence
and thus may effectively relegate the prosecution in some cases to reliance on older,
less reliable forms of proof.”310 Justice Breyer responded with an argument that
enforcing confrontation as a rule of production would indeed “undermine, not
fortify, the accuracy of factfinding at a criminal trial” and thereby “increase the risk
of convicting the innocent.”311 Justice Breyer reached a dubious conclusion: “An
interpretation of the Clause that risks greater prosecution reliance upon less reliable
evidence cannot be sound.”312
Justice Breyer also urged that confrontation’s rule of production yield to the societal interest in prosecuting and convicting guilty individuals.313 He worried about what
might happen if “say, a victim’s body has decomposed, repetition of the autopsy
306

Justice Breyer claimed that cross-examination cannot “prevent admission of faulty
evidence,” and is “rarely effective” in demonstrating the weakness or falsity of forensic
evidence. Id. at 2250. For an argument that cross-examination can prevent the admission of
faulty evidence, see Metzger, supra note 25.
307
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring).
308
See, e.g., id. at 2228 (plurality opinion) (explaining how a rule of production would put
economic pressure on prosecutors to forgo DNA tests).
309
See, e.g., id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining how prosecution would have
to rely on less reliable evidence).
310
Id. at 2227 (plurality opinion).
311
Id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that enforcing confrontation as rule of
production may “increase the risk of convicting the innocent [as] . . . the additional cost and
complexity involved in requiring live testimony from perhaps dozens of ordinary laboratory
technicians who participate in the preparation of a DNA profile may well force a laboratory
‘to reduce the amount of DNA testing it conducts, and force prosecutors to forgo forensic
DNA analysis in cases where it might be highly probative’” (quoting Brief for New York
County District Attorney’s Office & the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (No. 10-8505),
2011 WL 5125054)).
312
Id. (“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the
evidence against a criminal defendant.” (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845
(1990))). Justice Breyer revealed his indifference to confrontation as a prosecutorial burden
by urging that a defendant should “provide good reason to doubt the laboratory’s competence
or the validity of its accreditation” before a court should permit him to question the forensic
report. Id. at 2252. Why? Because the defendant’s satisfaction of this new burden would
demonstrate that “the alternative safeguard of reliability . . . no longer exist[s] and the
Constitution would [then] entitle defendant to Confrontation Clause protection.” Id.
313
Id. at 2251.
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may not be possible. What is to happen if the medical examiner dies before trial?”314
Notwithstanding Crawford, cost weighed heavily on the Justices’ minds.
In response to concerns about lessening the prosecution’s burden under the
Confrontation Clause, Justices Alito and Breyer adopted the discredited argument
that the availability of the Compulsory Process Clause mooted any Confrontation
Clause objection.315 Justice Alito argued that relieving the prosecution of its burden
of production “will not prejudice any defendant who really wishes to probe the reliability of the DNA testing done in a particular case because those who participated
in the testing may always be subpoenaed by the defense and questioned at trial.”316
Justice Breyer reiterated this position: excusing the prosecution from producing the
forensic declarant would still “leave[ ] the defendant free to call the laboratory employee as a witness if the employee is available.”317 The costs of confrontation were
simply greater than the plurality was willing to bear, so they focused their arguments
on reliability and access to witnesses rather than the procedural mandates of the
Confrontation Clause.
The Williams dissenters were also deeply engaged in examining confrontation
as a rule of reliability rather than production. Although the dissenters urged enforcement of confrontation as a rule of production, the dissent relied heavily on a
reliability analysis.318 Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion began by emphasizing
how cross-examination contributes to substantive reliability.319 Describing a stunning example of an erroneous DNA report from the Cellmark laboratory, Justice
Kagan stated bluntly: “Our Constitution contains a mechanism for catching such
errors—the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.”320 The “cure” for these errors
was the requirement that “testimony against a criminal defendant be subject to
cross-examination.”321
The dissenters urged reversal in Williams because “if a prosecutor wants to introduce the results of forensic testing into evidence, he must afford the defendant an
opportunity to cross-examine an analyst responsible for the test.”322 In this analysis,
314

Id.
Id. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
316
Id. (emphasis added).
317
Id. at 2251–52 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
318
See id. at 2266–76 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
319
Id. at 2264.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Id. (emphasis added). As Justice Kagan noted, “Once confronted, [an] analyst [may]
discover[ ] and disclose[ ] the error she ha[s] made.” Id. However, that speaks to the value
of production as a device that requires witnesses to reconsider and re-examine their
testimony. Surely, if the prosecution had called the witness to the stand, the witness would
still have been forced to review her report and, perhaps reconsider her conclusions, regardless of whether the defendant cross-examined her. So, although it is true that “[c]rossexamination of the analyst is especially likely to reveal whether vials have been switched,
315
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production only serves to advance cross-examination: “Forensic evidence is reliable
only when properly produced, and the Confrontation Clause prescribes a particular
method for determining whether that has happened.”323 The dissenters never addressed the more basic proposition: without producing the declarant, the prosecution cannot offer the evidence at all. The dissenters thus failed to acknowledge
confrontation as a rule of production that requires the government to produce its
witnesses in order to satisfy its burdens of production and persuasion.324
In sum, Williams reflects the Justices’ concerted efforts to reclassify forensic
evidence as non-testimonial, not on principle, but as a practical expedient designed
to evade the rule of production. Prosecutors and legislatures remain free to “create
an exception that presumptively would allow introduction of DNA reports from
accredited crime laboratories” to substitute for witness production.325 The Crawford
Court ostensibly rejected this result. Yet, the “costs” of confrontation’s production
mandate had assumed a central place in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF A COST-DRIVEN CONFRONTATION JURISPRUDENCE
Swayed by its concerns about the costs of production, the Court has paid insufficient attention to confrontation as a structural guarantee of a particular type of adversary
system. In our constitutional system, the prosecution bears the burdens of production and persuasion. All of the initiative burdens of criminal procedure depend upon
prosecutorial action. Yet, the Court’s persistent preoccupation with cost threatens
the most basic adversary structures of constitutional criminal procedure.
A. Production as a Fundamental Component of the Adversary System
Viewed in a structural or architectural light, the Confrontation Clause gives a
defendant the constitutional right to rely on the presumption of innocence. In practical terms, this means that a defendant may do nothing and still put the government
to its full burden of proof. This burden of proof includes the burdens of production
and persuasion. In the specific context of the Confrontation Clause, that burden of
samples contaminated, tests incompletely run, or results inaccurately recorded,” id. at 2264–65,
it is equally true that witness production is also likely to lead to the internal discovery of
errors or omissions in the prosecutor’s case.
323
Id. at 2264.
324
Id. at 2267. Justice Kagan noted that the expert witness “could not convey what [the
actual analyst] knew or observed about . . . the particular test and testing process he employed.”
Id. (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011)). Therefore, Williams’s
counsel “could not ask questions about that analyst’s ‘proficiency, the care he took in perform-ing his work, and his veracity.’” Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716 n.7). Justice
Kagan did not address the more basic proposition that, without producing the declarant, the
prosecution cannot offer the evidence at all.
325
Id. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring).

1038

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:995

production requires the prosecution to produce live testimonial witnesses or forego
reliance on those witnesses’ statements. The defendant’s only confrontation “burdens” arise: (1) during the witness’s testimony, when the defendant must timely
object to Confrontation Clause violations; and (2) after the witness’s testimony,
when the defendant must exercise or waive the right to cross-examination.
Before Melendez-Diaz, it was well established that confrontation’s rule of production was an automatic right. The right “to be confronted by the witnesses” had
always been understood as a right that “arise[s] automatically on the initiation of
the adversary process.”326 The two-part Confrontation Clause creates a rule of production that binds the prosecution “automatically” and upon “the initiation of the
adversary process.”327 The defendant’s right “to be confronted with adverse witnesses [is] designed to restrain the prosecution by regulating the procedures by which
it presents its case against the accused.”328 Thus, it applies “in every case, whether
or not the defendant seeks to rebut the case against him or to present a case of his
own.”329 As the Court explained in 1988, in Taylor v. Illinois, “no action by the
defendant is necessary to make [the Confrontation Clause] active in his or her case.”330
Rather, the Confrontation Clause applies in every criminal case, without defendant
demand, because it “shield[s] the defendant from potential prosecutorial abuses.”331
Only after the prosecution meets its burden of production does the defendant have
the right to exercise or waive his right to cross-examination.
In the Constitution’s acquittal-biased adversary system, the prosecution bears
the burdens of production and persuasion. Whereas the Confrontation Clause controls the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the Compulsory Process Clause
“comes into play at the close of the prosecution’s case. It operates exclusively at the
defendant’s initiative and provides him with affirmative aid in presenting his defense.”332 The Taylor Court further explains:
[T]he right to compel the presence and present the testimony of
witnesses provides the defendant with a sword that may be employed to rebut the prosecution’s case. The decision whether to
employ it in a particular case rests solely with the defendant.
The very nature of the right requires that its effective use be
preceded by deliberate planning and affirmative conduct.333
326

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).
Id.
328
Id. at 410 n.14 (quoting Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 74 (1974)).
329
Id. (quoting Westen, supra note 328, at 74).
330
Id. at 410.
331
Id.
332
Id. at 410 n.14 (quoting Westen, supra note 328, at 74).
333
Id. at 410.
327
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However, the Court’s flawed Melendez-Diaz dicta endorsing notice-anddemand erroneously lumps confrontation in with other contingent and defendantinitiated constitutional rights. Based upon that flawed premise, the Court endorsed an
unprecedented application of demand-waiver rules to the Confrontation Clause. The
Melendez-Diaz dicta alleges that “[t]he defendant always has the burden of raising
his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time
within which he must do so.”334 According to the Court, this means that, “[s]tates
are free to adopt procedural rules governing [the timing of a defendant’s exercise of the
Confrontation Clause].”335 A demand-waiver doctrine holds that “a prior demand is a
necessary condition” to the exercise of a constitutional right.336 In a demand-waiver
regime, a defendant who does not demand a particular constitutional right waives
that right by silence. In a demand-waiver regime, “it is irrelevant why the defense
did not file a demand. . . . Failure to demand constitutes a ‘waiver’ of the right.”337
As the Melendez-Diaz Court states, “It is common to require a defendant to exercise
his rights under the Compulsory Process Clause in advance of trial, announcing his
intent to present certain witnesses.”338 Simply put, the Constitution permits restrictions upon the timing of a defendant’s exercise of the compulsory process right,
because a failure to do so would hinder the truth-seeking function of criminal process.339
The Court jumps from this compulsory process assertion to the radical proposition
that “[t]here is no conceivable reason why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation Clause rights before trial.”340
Yet, this is not the case with mandatory rights. Once the prosecution files a valid
bill of information or indictment, the Constitution prescribes a set of mandatory minimum criminal procedures. Although a defendant may waive those procedures, in the
absence of a waiver, the Constitution mandates procedural compliance. The structuralprocedural protections provided by the Sixth Amendment “arise automatically on
the initiation of the adversary process and no action by the defendant is necessary
to make them active in his or her case.”341 Such rights “shield the defendant from
potential prosecutorial abuses.”342 The Supreme Court has already considered, and
334

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 327 (2009).
Id.
336
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
337
Metzger, supra note 25, at 517.
338
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327.
339
See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414–15 (1988) (“In order to reject petitioner’s
argument that preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation it is neither
necessary nor appropriate for us to attempt to draft a comprehensive set of standards to guide
the exercise of discretion in every possible case. . . . The integrity of the adversary process,
which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence . . . and the potential prejudice
to the truth-determining function of the trial process must also weigh in the balance.”).
340
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327.
341
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410.
342
Id.
335
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rejected, the application of a demand-waiver regime to automatic trial rights.343 In
Barker v. Wingo,344 the Supreme Court considered the application of a demand-waiver
doctrine to the right to a speedy trial. The Barker court held that “[a] defendant has
no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty.”345
As to those procedures controlled by the prosecution, the rights—from a defendant’s perspective—are self-executing. Consider, for example, a hypothetical (competent) defendant who conscientiously objects to all criminal proceedings against her.
At arraignment, she refuses to enter a plea. In response, the court will enter a plea of
“not guilty,” thereby triggering a series of processes mandated by the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution and subject to overarching principles of the Fifth Amendment. The
defendant is entitled to a speedy trial. She need not demand it; the right devolves
upon her as a result of the prosecution’s initiation of proceedings. Conversely, by
virtue of its burden of production, once it charges a defendant, the prosecution bears
the burden of providing that defendant with a speedy trial and bears the constitutional risk (of dismissal with prejudice) associated with failure to meet its burden.346
A felony defendant need not request a trial by jury; it is his absolute right, and
he alone can waive it. Although bench trials can produce constitutionally valid convictions, jury trials are the mandatory default procedure. Thus, if the court or counsel
inquires whether the defendant wants a jury trial and the defendant stands mute, the
process defaults to the constitutional requisite of a jury trial. Judge trials are prohibited unless the defendant waives the jury trial right.
Similarly, a defendant need not demand a jury of his peers; the Constitution bestows that upon him without any effort or action on the defendant’s part. True, the
defendant may argue that the jury provided to him is not in fact constitutionally
compliant, but the defendant makes—or waives—that argument after the venire has
been assembled. The assemblage of the venire itself requires no action by the defendant. If a defendant arrived in court on the day of his trial, no judge would ever
343

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
Id.
345
Id. at 527 (footnote omitted).
346
As Justice Stephens of the Washington Supreme Court noted in a recent dissenting
opinion:
[T]he majority argues that we must deny defendants the right to confront
laboratory analysts because the burden it places on the State is too
heavy . . . . The Sixth Amendment also guarantees to criminal defendants
the right to a speedy and public trial, to have facts (even “neutral” and
“scientific” facts) found by a jury, and to be appointed a competent lawyer
at no cost. Each of these guaranties has cost our State incalculable
money, time, and lost convictions, and the costs continue to mount. If
the majority is willing to exempt laboratory analysts from cross-examination to save a little, why not strike confrontation entirely, or do away
with jury trials and court-appointed attorneys, and save much more?
State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 526 (Wash. 2014) (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2842 (2014).
344
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be permitted to announce, “Since you did not specifically demand a jury, I am going
to treat this as a bench trial.”
Once the jury is assembled, the defendant need not demand the presumption of
innocence, nor must he request that the burdens of production and persuasion be
placed upon the government. Those are constitutional baselines, and a prosecutorial
failure to meet its burden of proof and overcome the presumption of innocence
results in the defendant’s acquittal.
“The defendant’s rights to be informed of the charges against him, to receive a
speedy and public trial, to be tried by a jury, to be assisted by counsel, and to be
confronted with adverse witnesses” arise when the prosecution charges the defendant.347 These rights share a common regulatory function; they are “designed to
restrain the prosecution by regulating the procedures by which it presents its case
against the accused.”348 Accordingly, “[t]hey apply in every case, whether or not the
defendant seeks to rebut the case against him or to present a case of his own.”349
“[N]o action by the defendant is necessary to make [those rights] active in his or her
case.”350 In the Sixth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has never adopted a
demand-waiver doctrine under which a defendant must demand a right and nondemand is deemed waiver.351
In contrast, the Constitution also bestows certain contingent rights upon a
defendant; those rights only arise if the defendant properly invokes them. The
structure of the Constitution makes the exercise of those rights “dependent entirely
on the defendant’s initiative.”352 For example, the right to compulsory process “operates
exclusively at the defendant’s initiative and provides him with affirmative aid in
presenting his defense.”353
Whether the Constitution permits trial procedures that narrow the in-court
protections associated with the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of confrontation’s physical architecture. The practical
meaning of confrontation supports its function. For example, even a child witness
must appear before the defendant who is alleged to have abused him. The confrontation guarantee encompasses a defendant’s right to compel the witness to “stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy
of belief.”354
Current notice-and-demand statutes require that a defendant, during pretrial
proceedings, file a written motion or notice demanding that the government produce
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354

Westen, supra note 328, at 74.
Id.
Id.
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410.
Westen, supra note 328, at 74.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968).
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its forensic witness(es) at trial.355 Although the Melendez-Diaz dissenters correctly
characterized these notice-and-demand statutes as “burden-shifting,”356 the majority
erroneously maintained that “these statutes shift no burden whatever.”357 The
majority based this astounding conclusion upon the procedural realities of trial confrontation: “The defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation
Clause objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which
he must do so.”358 This oversimplification ignores the important structural protections provided by the Confrontation Clause.
Even the simplest of these notice-and-demand statutes requires a defendant to
actively invoke his confrontation rights. Thus, this ruling presents a dangerous threat
to the structural protection associated with the confrontation guarantee: namely, the
criminal defendant’s right to “do nothing at all” and rely on the government’s failure
of proof. Surely, this is the same harm of which the Melendez-Diaz court complained:
a systemic rule that “shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the
State to the accused.”359 Since “the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the
prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse
witnesses into court,”360 why should defendants bear the burden of “demanding”
rights that devolved upon them the moment they stood accused? How is a noticeand-demand statute any different than the system the Court rejected in MelendezDiaz, “a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits
and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses”? 361
B. Production as an Imperative Cost of Confrontation
In the Confrontation Clause context, a pretrial failure to demand the production
of live witnesses may forever foreclose the defendant from confronting and crossexamining crucial state witnesses. Silence becomes waiver. As it was in the case of
speedy trial rights, a demand-waiver doctrine places defense counsel in what is, to
say the least, an “awkward position.”362 Unless counsel demands production of the
witness, counsel is in danger of frustrating her client’s confrontation right. Yet,
absent some strong sense of how the witness is likely to testify, counsel has no way
to know whether production of the witness will help or hurt her client.
355

See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 350, 356 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
357
Id. at 327 (majority opinion).
358
Id.
359
Id. at 324.
360
Id.
361
Id. at 324–25.
362
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972).
356
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Confrontation’s production mandate operates as part of a larger bundle of Sixth
Amendment trial rights that burden the prosecution and protect the defendant.363
Confrontation’s trial processes—the production of witnesses for sworn accusation
and cross-examination—must conform to the Sixth Amendment’s jury and public
trial requirements.364 “[V]iewed holistically[,] the Sixth Amendment incorporates
‘the blank pad rule’ that requires courts to make sure that criminal convictions rest
only on evidence produced in open court.”365 The prosecution’s witnesses must
confront the accused in the presence of the jury and at a public trial.366
Coupled with this requirement of a public confrontation, confrontation’s production mandate makes the government accountable for the prosecution’s investigative and adjudicative choices. Confrontation requires the prosecution to introduce
its witnesses to the public, even if they are distasteful co-conspirators or informants
with significant criminal histories. And, as it calls these witnesses to the stand, the
prosecution metaphorically “vouches” for them, linking its institutional credibility
to its witnesses’ credibility.367 The prosecution cannot conceal from the public the
ways in which the prosecution located, prepared, or induced its witnesses to testify.368 Confrontation’s burden of production exposes prosecutorial practice to public
scrutiny and forces the prosecution to assume responsibility for the character and
363
The Framers enacted the Confrontation Clause “in conjunction with the other procedural
rights surrounding trial by jury” and anticipated the holistic enforcement of those procedural
rights. Berger, supra note 31, at 586; see also Graham, supra note 84, at 211 (“[H]istory
suggests that confrontation comprises one small part of the ‘holistic Sixth Amendment’ that
the Founders called ‘trial by jury.’” (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6348, p. 780 (2000))).
364
The public trial right demonstrates that “[t]he means used by the government to prosecute crime is a matter of public concern.” Berger, supra note 31, at 560 n.13, 561 (citing
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132–33 (1991)
(“[P]rotection of the people against self-interested government” was the central concern “in
the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights.”)). Berger emphasizes: “Confrontation was
part of an arsenal designed not only to ensure accurate results in criminal trials, but also to
restrain the government in criminal trials from acting in a covert, repugnant manner that
would be concealed from the people.” Berger, supra note 31, at 586.
365
Graham, supra note 84, at 210.
366
See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931) (explaining that producing
a witness for examination before the jury enhances community’s participation as production
allows the witness to “be identified with his community so that independent testimony may be
sought and offered of his reputation for veracity in his own neighborhood,” and permits the jury
to “interpret his testimony in the light reflected upon it by knowledge of his environment”).
Although a defendant can waive the right to trial by jury, the defendant cannot “waive” the
public’s right to view the trial.
367
At common law, the party who called the witness to the stand “vouche[d]” for the witness. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (quoting Clark v. Lansford, 191 So.
2d 123, 125 (Miss. 1966)). In contrast, when a judge instructs a jury to accept an out-of-court
statement as fact—for example, by reading a stipulation or instructing the jury on prima facie
proof—the evidence appears less partisan and more neutral.
368
See Berger, supra note 31, at 560–61.
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conduct of its witnesses and its agents. It also forces prosecutors to assume responsibility for their allocation of scarce resources.369
Finally, confrontation’s production imperative echoes the due process reasonable
doubt rule, which places the burdens of production and persuasion on the prosecution.
The burden of production requires the prosecution to “work” for a conviction; it must
locate its witnesses and present their testimony at trial. If the prosecution fails to produce
a witness and, as a result, fails to adduce evidence of an essential element of the charged
crime, the Constitution demands an acquittal. In this manner, the Confrontation Clause
also enforces a defendant’s right to rely upon the reasonable doubt rule for acquittal.
The Court has previously noted that the good faith of government actors is
irrelevant if their conduct erodes the confrontation guarantee. “The Framers . . .
would not have been content to indulge [an] assumption” that unconfronted testimony was admitted in good faith reliance on the accuracy of its statements.370 Thus,
the Court concluded that then, as now, “government officers[ ] could not always be
trusted to safeguard the rights of the people.”371 Would Framers who were “loath to
leave too much discretion in judicial hands,” have readily ceded that same authority
to state legislatures?372 Just as Roberts did “violence to [the Framers’] design,” so too
does a legislative rule that exists solely to minimize the likelihood that a defendant
will exercise a right so important to the Framers.373
Of course, this is precisely what notice-and-demand statutes do; because there
is no obligation for the State to represent that it does, in fact, have an available witness,
the State can play a game of constitutional “chicken” and, given the extent to which
public defenders are overburdened, no one is likely to call the State’s bluff.374 Legislative exceptions to the Confrontation Clause’s production rule
alter[ ] the balance struck by the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
does not envision an adversary proceeding between two equal
parties. If that were so, we might well benefit from procedures
patterned after the Rules of the Marquis of Queensberry. But, the
Constitution recognized the awesome power of indictment and
the virtually limitless resources of government investigators.
Much of the Bill of Rights is designed to redress the advantage
that inheres in a government prosecution.375
369
Miller & Ricciuti, supra note 267, at 15 (noting that, after Melendez-Diaz, “prosecutors
will be forced to make hard decisions about which cases to pursue and which to ignore”).
370
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
371
Id.
372
Id.
373
Id. at 67–68.
374
See also Bellin, supra note 203, at 1897 n.163 (“As a practical matter, the vast chasm of
resources (and sometimes energy) between prosecution and defense makes the defense’s ability
to subpoena witnesses an even less palatable means of enforcing the confrontation right.”).
375
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Simply put, “defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt.”376
Relieving the government of its automatic burden of production and burdening the
defendant with the obligation of demanding production alters the basic rule that the
defendant has no responsibility to bring himself to trial or to assist the government
in its prosecution. Justice Fortas once explained, “a man is not obliged to furnish the
state with ammunition to use against him.”377 The prosecution has “no right to
compel [a defendant] to surrender or impair his right of self-defense.”378 How much
less, then, can the State compel a defendant to demand the weapons that the Constitution unconditionally promises him?
The burden of production “reduc[es] the relative disadvantage individual defendants typically face relative to the state’s own vast trial resources.”379 In the
context of self-incrimination, “[b]y forcing the state to speak, but not the (usually
weaker) defendant, we get closer to Fortas’s adversarial ideal of two equals meeting
in battle.”380 Similarly, by forcing the prosecution, but not the defense, to produce
evidence at trial, we advance the adversarial model.381
Like self-incrimination, the adversarial system uses confrontation’s production
mandate “to help tame the state’s 500-pound gorilla: the refusal to allow the state
to forcibly extract [proof] from the mouth of its opponent is a part of the ritual of
respect for individual autonomy that is embodied by a fully adversarial trial.”382 Like
self-incrimination, confrontation’s production mandate “forces courts to account for
the value of genuine adversarialism” by requiring the physical production of the
prosecution’s testimonial witnesses.383 The prosecution’s burden of production is
part of the fabric of our adversary system. Eliminating that burden is a first step
down the slippery slope to trials by affidavit.
376

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
Kenworthey Bilz, Self-Incrimination Doctrine Is Dead; Long Live Self-Incrimination
Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, and the Anxieties of the Liberal State, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 807, 847 (2008) (quoting Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere
Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B. ASS’N J. 91, 98–99 (1954)).
378
Id.(quoting Fortas, supra note 377, at 98–99).
379
Id.
380
Id.
381
Confrontation’s detractors argue otherwise. In 2009, then–Solicitor General Elena
Kagan argued:
[A] statutory right to cross-examine the forensic analyst meets constitutional requirements even though it does not guarantee that the
prosecution will first present the analyst’s direct testimony during its
case-in-chief. Neither the text of the Confrontation Clause, nor its history, nor the defendant’s tactical preference justifies a constitutional
rule that would mandate a particular order of proof at trial.
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CONCLUSION
Confrontation’s stringent burden of prosecutorial witness production “suffers
from a major weakness: it can make a trial terribly inconvenient.”384 Yet, by constitutional design, the conviction and prosecution of a presumptively innocent person
is a difficult and resource-intensive task. The Constitution creates “a deliberate
imbalance” in the burdens associated with prosecuting (rather than defending) a criminal
case.385 A commitment to confrontation as a procedural right “precludes the counterarguments that confrontation should be limited to ease the burden on the prosecution
and that requiring confrontation in cases where it [will be] of little value will give defendants a windfall.”386 Yet that is precisely what the Court has done in MelendezDiaz and what the troubling confusion of Williams suggests may come in the future.
The Court’s few pre-incorporation cases addressing the Confrontation Clause
embraced the primacy of the prosecution’s production imperative. To the extent the
Court was faced with the costs of mandatory production, the Court was appropriately cost-blind. Then, as now, the Confrontation Clause promotes more than the
truth-seeking function of criminal procedure. The Confrontation Clause promotes
a system of criminal procedure that was carefully crafted to place the procedural
burdens necessary to a conviction squarely upon the government’s shoulders. The
practical meaning of confrontation supports its function. The prosecution must produce even a child witness, if that witness offers testimony against a defendant.387
Viewed in a structural or architectural light, the confrontation guarantee means
that a defendant has a constitutional right to rely on the presumption of innocence, and
put the government to its full burden of producing its witnesses and evidence sufficient to support a conviction. In a modern context, this also means that the defendant
has the right to relieve the government of its burden of production in exchange for
some other benefit to the defendant. Inaction by the defendant results in the full range
of constitutional protections: trial by jury, accompanied by the presumption of innocence and the right to “confront” the government’s witnesses.388 Inaction by the
government—a failure to produce witnesses or meet its burden of proof—results in
acquittal. Only a vigilant commitment to a cost-indifferent Confrontation Clause can
preserve this constitutional balance.
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